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Abstract
This thesis analyses the process of designing a new engine plant that implements the
principles of the Toyota Production System. The process of designing this type of
engine plant is very different from the one used to design a typical mass production
plant. In order to achieve the new design, a large, early investment in manufacturing
engineers is required. These manufacturing engineers are necessary to address the
numerous details that are essential to implementing the Toyota Production System.
Specific examples will be cited that highlight the differences in the production systems as
implemented in an engine plant, as well as the resulting benefits of implementing the
new production system.
Recommendations include investing in enough resources early in the project. The
largest window of opportunity for properly designing the engine plant to implement the
Toyota Production System is at the beginning of the design process, before the machine
tools are ordered and the building is designed. Additional recommendations are to seek
expertise. The Toyota Production System is very different from traditional production
systems. Without help, it is very difficult to both learn and implement a new production
system within the time frame of an engine plant design.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Research Introduction
A revolution is occurring in how automotive plants are designed. Traditionally,
automotive plants have been designed using mass production techniques. These plants
produced competitive vehicles until the 1970's. At this time, new competitors from
Japan began taking a significant share of the world automobile market. This new
competition was able to produce automobiles at a higher quality, lower assembly hours,
and lower inventory levels than their US and European counterparts'.
These Japanese competitors were using different manufacturing techniques than their
US and European competitors were. These techniques were coined "lean production"
by the book The Machine That Chanqed the World', based on a 1986 MIT International
Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) study. The study concluded the best of these lean
producers is Toyota.
Toyota has established the world renowned Toyota Production System. It is a
production system which focuses on eliminating waste in the ways that companies
employ human resources, equipment and material 2. Eliminating waste results in
increased quality and decreased cost. As a result, the Toyota Production System has
become the world-wide benchmark for production systems.
The revolution in automotive plant design has been to build a plants that are competitive
with Toyota's. Automotive companies have been studying and implementing many
aspects of the Toyota Production System. This implementation ranges from designing a
plant that has less work-in-process than a typical plant, to a plant that has a lot of visual
controls. Two examples are the Toyota Georgetown plant, and the NUMMI plant (which
is a joint venture between GM and Toyota).
This revolution in plant design, or process design, has also led to changes in product
designs. Timing is critical in new product and process development. The early stages of
product development are obviously when it is easiest to make changes to the product.
Studies have shown that 80% of the cost of a product is determined in the product
design phase, as is shown in Figure 1 - When Product Costs are Determined in Product
Development3 . Thus, it is believed that the greatest opportunity of achieving the goals
of a lean production system (eliminating waste, reducing cost, and improving quality)
occur early in the product development process.
Figure 1 - When Product Costs are Determined in Product Development 3
Many times a product design engineer may not be able to foresee all of the
manufacturing concerns that will arise when a production process is designed for a
product. Traditionally, production process design has occurred after the product design
was complete. Any changes to the product design to improve its manufacturability were
extremely costly. More recently, many companies have found success in concurrently
developing the product and the production process. This concurrent development allows
both product and manufacturing engineers to have input on each other's designs, and
jointly solve problems in development. This thesis will describe how a new engine
program used concurrent product and process development in implementing the Toyota
Production System.
U
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Stages of Product Development
1.2 Research Overview & Hypothesis
This thesis will describe research that was done at one of the Big Three US auto
manufacturers. To protect confidentiality, this firm will be referred to as US-Auto in this
thesis. The researcher worked closely with engineering teams at US-Auto that were
designing a new engine and a plant for the new engine. The engine program's goal is to
create a plant that implements the principles of the Toyota Production System.
The hypothesis of this thesis is that creating an engine plant that operates in a lean
manner, that is, like plants in the Toyota Production System, requires a design process
that is very different from the traditional factory design process that has been used by
US-Auto. Designing the lean plant requires familiarity with a new production system - a
production system that is run through visual management and designed to quickly
identify problems. It also requires the much larger task of implementing the new
production system.
To design a plant based on the principles of the Toyota Production System, US-Auto
hired 40 more manufacturing engineers than have been used on traditional US-Auto
engine programs. These extra manufacturing engineers were needed to address the
many details that are necessary to properly implement lean manufacturing. The
manufacturing engineers learned many lessons about how to design a lean plant. This
thesis will compare the plant design process used by US-Auto on the new engine
program to the traditional design process, and will document the lessons learned as
examples that demonstrate the differences in the design processes as well as the
benefits attained from implementing lean manufacturing. In addition, the thesis will
discuss how the implementation of lean manufacturing also revised the process used to
design the engine. The intent of thesis is to provide a helpful learning tool that future
power train programs can use to help them in their implementation of lean
manufacturing.
1.3 Chapter Overview
The following is a summary of the contents of each chapter of this thesis.
Chapter 1: is an introduction to the thesis and a description of the thesis hypothesis.
Chapter 2: describes the background of the thesis. It defines the concepts of lean
manufacturing, and the Toyota Production System. It also gives an overview of
the engine program on which this thesis research was conducted.
Chapter 3: describes how the engine program implemented lean manufacturing on a
machining line.
Chapter 4: describes how the engine program implemented lean manufacturing on the
engine final assembly line.
Chapter 5: describes organizational issues with implementing lean manufacturing.
Chapter 6: contains conclusions and recommendations
Chapter 7: is appendices.
2. Background
This chapter will provide background information for the rest of the thesis. It will
describe the engine program on which this research was conducted. It will also give an
overview of the Toyota Production System, as well as a production system that US-Auto
has created.
2.1. Overview of the Engine Program at US-Auto
This research was done while working with a team that is developing a new US-Auto
engine. The plant will be located in an emerging market country, and all engines will be
exported to G74 countries.
The engine program's mission is to develop the lowest overall cost engine business.
The program will accomplish this through the use of the principles of the Toyota
Production System, and the US-Auto Production System (both described below).
This research was conducted while working with teams at US-Auto that were designing
both the engine and the engine plant. The research time period was during the heart of
this design process, see Table 1 - US Auto Engine Development Schedule, below. A
more detailed schedule can be found in Appendix 2.
Table 1 - US Auto Engine Development Schedule
As has been stated in the Introduction, it is during the product development process that
many of the costs of a product are determined. To assure that as many of the
manufacturing issues were surfaced during the product design process, US-Auto formed
Task Start Date End Date
Engine Design Q1, Year 1 Q2, Year 3
Plant Design Q2, Year 2 Q2, Year 3
Thesis Research Q2, Year 2 Q4, Year 2
Engine Testing Q2, Year 2 Q2, Year 2
Plant Construction Q2, Year 2 Q1, Year 4
Engine Production Q2, Year 5 TBD
Simultaneous Engineering Teams. (A detailed discussion of Simultaneous Engineering
Teams is presented in Steven David's 1991 masters thesis5 .) These teams were made
up of both product engineers and manufacturing engineers. The teams were
responsible for both designing the engine and the engine plant. The majority of this
thesis will describe the lessons learned while working with the simultaneous engineering
teams in implementing lean manufacturing in the engine plant, and the effects of lean
manufacturing on the engine design.
An engine plant primarily consists of two types of departments: machining and
assembly. In general, the machining departments machine the primary metal
components of the engine, such as the cylinder head, cylinder block, crankshaft,
camshafts, and connecting rods. These components are also termed "the 5 C's."
Engine plants also have a final engine assembly department. This department
assembles both the machined components from the machining departments in the
plant, as well as components purchased from external suppliers. In addition to
assembly, the department also performs functional tests on the engines. It then ships
the engines to the car plants.
The new US-Auto plant will have four machining departments (cylinder block, cylinder
head, crankshaft, and connecting rod) as well as two assembly departments (cylinder
head sub-assembly, and engine assembly). The thesis research was conducted with
two simultaneous engineering teams. One team was responsible for designing a
machined product and production line (for the crankshaft), and the other team was
responsible for designing the final engine assembly line. The lessons learned in these
departments are transferable to other machining or assembly departments. (Note: the
fifth major machined component of the engine, the camshafts, was outsourced by US-
Auto for this plant.)
The simultaneous engineering teams were responsible as a team for integrating the
product design, procurement and/or manufacturing of their portion of the engine. The
teams met on an ad hoc basis, and were comprised of both full time members, who only
worked on one portion of the engine, as well as part time members, who worked on
many parts of the engine. A typical simultaneous engineering team consisted of four full
time manufacturing engineers, two full time product design engineers, one part time
quality engineer, and one part time procurement expert. Once the machine tool
suppliers were selected, at least two machine tool design engineers joined the
simultaneous engineering teams.
Although the teams met on an ad hoc basis, each team had co-team leaders, one from
product design, and one from manufacturing. As a whole, each team was held
responsible by the program for deliverables such as project status, and incorporation of
design for manufacturing or design for assembly.
Below is an illustration of an engine to help familiarize the reader with the components
that are mentioned in the thesis.
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Figure 2 - Illustration of a Typical Automobile Engine6
2.2. Overview of the Toyota Production System
US-Auto designed the new engine plant using the US-Auto Production System (UPS)
and the Toyota Production System. The UPS is described in the next section. It is a
production system that is based on the principles of the Toyota Production System.
The framework of the Toyota Production System is shown in Figure 3 - Toyota
Production System Framework, below. This illustration is used by Toyota to describe its
production system. In general, "...the Toyota Production System is a system of
practices, guided by very specific philosophies which suggest how everyone within the
organization should approach their responsibilities and how they should relate to
customers, suppliers, colleagues, subordinates and superiors." This graphic describes
some of the main elements of the system, at a very simple level. In operation, the
Toyota Production System is a very detailed system that others have found very difficult
to duplicate.
Kaizen
Flexible
M Motivated
.. 4 Most Employees
essential aCitical
Sr- element
Maintenance
of Standards
Standardization, Heijunka
Goals For the CUSTOMER For the EMPLOYEES For the COMPANY
Desired outcomes Highest quality Work satisfaction Market flexibility
Lowest cost Job security Profit (from cost
Shortest lead-time Consistent income reduction)
Philosophies Customer First Respect for Humanity Elimination of Waste
Figure 3 - Toyota Production System Framework'
The foundation of the Toyota Production System is heiiunka, or leveled production.
"...Heijunka is the term used to describe a mixed production system, where various and
changeable sequences of mixed models are produced on the same assembly line9."
The other foundation element is standardization. Standardization is a term for assuring
that activities are performed in the same manner each time, i.e. a standard manner.
This refers to standardization in how all tasks are done, from operating a machine, to
doing quality checks, to shipping parts to customers. Standardization facilitates quick
problem detection and improvement. If a task is done the same way each time, and
suddenly begins producing bad products, it will be easy to check the process at that
moment against the standard process to help locate the source of trouble.
The left pillar of the Toyota Production System illustration is iidoka. Jidoka has been
translated as autonomation, meaning the machines have the autonomous capability to
use judgemento. An example of implementing jidoka on a machine means that it can
run without an operator attending, and will signal when it predicts it will need
maintenance, and stops by itself if it detects a problem.
The right pillar is just-in-time. This term refers to producing only what is needed, when it
is needed, in just the amount needed1 o. "Just In Time production eliminates lots of kinds
of waste. It eliminates the need for maintaining large inventories, which reduces
financing costs and storage costs. It eliminates the waste that occurs when changes in
specifications or shifts in demand render stocks of old items worthless. It also eliminates
the waste that occurs when defects go undetected in the manufacturing of large
batches 2.
The overarching principle of the Toyota Production System is kaizen, or continuous
improvement. Kaizen means always looking for a way to improve. The production
system is never complete, it is ever evolving, improving.
These elements of the Toyota Production System are used in designing both the plant
and the engine. These elements are not specific items that are implemented, instead,
they are criteria by which decisions are evaluated. For instance, when deciding material
flow in the plan, US-Auto made sure that inventory flowed through the lines in the same
direction (standardization), and that it was delivered in small quantities to the point of
use (just-in-time). These elements also apply to the design of the engine. For example
in designing the machined components, are the critical dimensions easy to check
(jidoka).
This section has been a brief overview of the Toyota Production System. An excellent
reference for more information is Yasuhiro Monden's book Toyota Production System:
An Integrated Approach to Just-In-Time", or Shigeo Shingo's A Study of the Toyota
Production System12.
2.3. Overview of the US-Auto Production System
This section will give an overview of what led US-Auto to develop a new production
system. This will be followed by an overview of the US-Auto Production System. In
1993, US-Auto developed the corporate mission to be the highest ranked worldwide car
and truck company by 2000. In order to determine what it will take to achieve this
mission, the senior executives of US-Auto benchmarked many of their worldwide
competitors during 1994. From this benchmarking trip, the executives concluded that to
accomplish their corporate mission, they would have the most challenge in surpassing
Toyota.
After this stunning benchmarking trip, US-Auto executives were in disagreement about
how to start improving the company. After much debate, the VP of Manufacturing
decided to begin the improvement process and charted a team to recommend how to
implement the principles of the Toyota Production System.
US-Auto recognized that its employees were unfamiliar with the Toyota Production
System, and would require training. Additionally, "executives did not want 'outsiders'
(e.g. consultants or professors) teaching the Toyota Production Systeml 3." Instead, US-
Auto wanted to develop the expertise internally. Thus, beginning in 1995, US-Auto
developed a series of courses to teach the principles of the Toyota Production System,
and termed the new production system and courses the US-Auto Production System
(UPS).
Because the efforts to implement the Toyota Production System were begun in the
manufacturing organization, UPS focuses on production. However, at Toyota, the
production system impacts the entire company. US-Auto has recently realized that the
impact of UPS is not well understood by the product design organization. As a result, a
task force is currently developing UDS - the US-Auto Design System. UDS will describe
world class deign processes and how lean manufacturing integrates with these
processes.
US-Auto chose to use cascade training to deploy UPS. In cascade training, the most
senior levels of management in the company receive the training, and then train their
direct reports. This next level of management then trains their direct reports, etc. Thus
the training is "cascaded" through the company. There are several reasons for this
training choice. US-Auto had experienced early success using cascade training. The
company also wanted senior management involved in the training on the belief that shop
floor changes would not last with out their leadership. This would ensure that employees
took the system seriously because they were learning from their boss, and it mean that
the management had to learn the system by teaching it.
The UPS training consists of a series of courses, which are continuously being added to.
The worldwide benchmarking trip that initiated the need for UPS occurred in 1994. By
early 1995, US-Auto had developed the first of the UPS courses, and began cascade
teaching them. By 1997, eight UPS courses existed, with additional courses planned.
As soon as a course is complete, it is made available to employees. Courses range
from describing techniques for quick error detection to the role of the leader.
Within US-Auto, UPS is predominately regarded as the concern of the manufacturing
engineers. Very few of the product design engineers or procurement personnel are
familiar with the details of UPS, and have little understanding of how UPS impacts their
jobs.
One of the ongoing lessons on the US-Auto new engine program is that UPS impacts
the entire program, not just the factory. At nearly every meeting, the program director
has found it necessary to prod the various teams and functional personnel on how they
are supporting the implementation of UPS. These questions were directed at all
members of the team. Manufacturing explained how the plant design was improving,
while product design engineering explained how the design was designed to make
manufacturing as easy and error proof as possible.
Making UPS important to the entire company will take a great deal of US-Auto's time
and resources. US-Auto can take some measures to facilitate the spread of UPS. The
current activity of developing the product development version of UPS is a good step. It
will give the product engineers a better understanding of how to implement UPS. It is
likely that the new engine program will be a vast improvement over the last US-Auto
engine program. If the new engine program meets all of its targets, US-Auto executives
need to uphold the program as a role model. Having a role model within US-Auto will
serve as a company wide inspiration that proves that US-Auto can implement the
principles of the Toyota Production System on an entire program. The additional tools
that describe how to apply UPS in more parts of the company, combined with an internal
success story, will accelerate the adoption of UPS within US-Auto.
The remainder of this thesis will describe how the US-Auto engine program implemented
UPS/TPS in the design of the engine and the engine plant. Specific learnings from both
the crankshaft machining line, and the final engine assembly line will be described.
2.4. Operational Targets for the New Engine Program
In order to understand the decisions that were made during the design of the production
process, it is necessary to understand the operational targets of the new engine program
plant. As has been stated above, US-Auto has recognized that the Toyota Production
System is their benchmark. Consequently, the operational targets, particularly staffing
levels, for the new engine plant are based on Toyota's Georgetown, Kentucky, engine
plant.
Table 2 - Operational Targets for the New US-Auto Engine Plant is a comparison of
staffing between a traditional US-Auto engine plant, and the new US-Auto engine plant.
Figure 4 - 1996 History of Engine Labor Productivity is a comparison of average hour per
engine for the Big-Three and Toyota.
Table 2 - Operational Targets for the New US-Auto Engine Plant
New US-Auto Plant Traditional US-Auto
Plant
Employees in a 5 20
Machining department
Employees in Final Assembly 40 100
Labor hours per engine 2.6 5.7
Inventory Levels Average 2 hours + safety - 5 days
Layout (sq. ft.) 400,000 600,000
Cost of Engine Plant $400 M $750M
Tool Management Strategy In-process changes Block changes
Information System Andon Board Varied, complex
Material Handling Point of Use Forklifts, conveyors
S4 A A-GM
W 4 --- Chrysler
0. -A- Ford
.3-
- 0 -- -Toyota
S2
1
0-
1993 1994 1995 1996
Figure 4 - 1996 History of Engine Labor Productivity4
One may question why a primary goal of this plant is low staffing, when it will be built in
an emerging market, where wages are relatively low. Low labor content is simply the
metric. In order to achieve the low content, the plant must run very effectively.
Everything in the plant must perform to expectations. This includes good castings, good
tool life, good material control & delivery, good dimensional quality of parts, and a
reliable production process.
2.5 Manufacturing Engineers on the New Engine Program
The reader may wonder how did US-Auto know that the machining lines it was designing
were properly implementing the Toyota principles. The new engine program took
several actions to make sure it was well educated in the principles of the Toyota
Production System and able to implement in the plant properly.
First, the new engine program made sure it was adequately staffed. Traditionally, US-
Auto staffed its engine development programs with 10-15 manufacturing engineers, and
relied heavily on the machine tool suppliers to design the machining lines. Since many
of the machine tool suppliers US-Auto traditionally uses did not design the lines based
on the Toyota Production System, US-Auto ended up with lines that operated in a mass
production method.
The new engine program on which this research was conducted was staffed much
differently. It had 55 manufacturing engineers, compared to the traditional 15. This
investment in additional manufacturing engineers paid off well. When the program was
launched, US-Auto estimated the cost of the new engine plant based on another engine
plant that it was just completing construction on. In their first few months, the
manufacturing engineers on the new engine program were able to take enough costs out
of the estimated costs to pay for their salaries over the two years that they would be on
the program. This savings occurred because the additional personnel was able to
carefully examine all the bids from the machine tool suppliers, and decided just which
features were necessary for this project, and eliminate all unnecessary or excessive
equipment. Additional savings were realized because US-Auto did not have to pay the
machine tool suppliers to manage the project. Traditionally, these project management
fees are charged in addition to the cost of the machine tools.
At the time that US-Auto began staffing this engine program, the labor market in the
automotive industry was very tight. As a result, many of the new manufacturing
engineers were new college graduates. It was both good and bad that these engineers
lacked work experience. US-Auto found they were eager to learn the new production
system and did not have any "bad habits" to unlearn. US-Auto had to spend a lot of time
educating these new hires on automobile engine fabrication, but much of this learning
occurred concurrently with benchmarking trips that engineers with prior experience
would have also conducted.
In addition to hiring a large number of manufacturing engineers for the new engine
program, US-Auto also made sure they had sufficient training and resources to learn
about lean manufacturing. For example, as soon as the manufacturing engineers were
hired, they were trained in all of the UPS courses.
As the process design began, US-Auto hired consulting firms that were very familiar with
Toyota Georgetown that worked with the teams as they were designing the lines. These
consultants served two roles, teachers and mentors. The consultants would hold
meetings to discuss the principles of the Toyota Production System, and give examples
of how the system was implemented in an engine plant. They would also meet with the
individual teams and review the process designs in detail. The process designs were
revised frequently. It was through training and continuously improving the process
designs that US-Auto was able to design a plant that is comparable to a Toyota plant.
Although US-Auto initially did not want to use consultants in creating UPS, the new
engine program quickly realized that it would need help to properly implement UPS
within the time frame set for the engine program. That is, the team did not have the time
to both learn and implement the principles of the Toyota Production Systems. The new
engine program was also very careful in choosing what consultants were hired for. The
team made sure it has a specific lack of expertise on a subject, and then sought
consultants who were experts in that field.
Once the new engine program is complete, the employees will be able to move on to
other US-Auto programs and disseminate the knowledge of the Toyota Production
System that they gained. These employees will continue the US-Auto tradition of using
internal teachers.
2.6 Thesis Scope
This thesis will describe how the US-Auto engine program implemented UPS/TPS in the
design of the engine and the engine plant. It will focus on the activities that occurred
during the early process design. It will compare elements of the new engine program
plant an engine designs to traditional US-Auto engine plants and engines.
The specific scope of the thesis is the time frame from the beginning of the
manufacturing process design, until the machine tool suppliers were selected. At US-
Auto this was a six-month period from June of Year 2 of the project through December
or Year 2. A more detailed schedule can be found in Appendix 2.
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3 Machining Line
This chapter will discuss implementing lean manufacturing in a machining line. It will be
begin with describing the process design lessons that US-Auto learned that apply to all
machining lines in the engine plant, followed by the lessons that were specific to the
crankshaft line. The remainder of the chapter will discuss the product design lessons
that US-Auto learned when designing lean engine component machining lines.
3.1 Overview of a Machining Line in an Engine Plant
The machining line of an engine plant starts with castings, and machines them into the
engineering drawing requirements. This is done by using large machine tools that
perform operations such as milling, drilling, reaming, tapping, honing, broaching,
grinding, and polishing. The machine tools are roughly 6'x6'x6'. A line that machines
one component for an engine may have 20 of these machine tools. Parts are usually
transferred between the machines by an automation system.
In designing its machining lines for the new engine plant, US-Auto's goal was to create a
line that would operate like the benchmark, a Toyota line. This meant that a machining
department, such as the crankshaft line, would have 4-5 team members, and one team
leader. Conversely, a traditional US-Auto plant may have up to 20 operators per
machining line.
In order to operate at this level of staffing, the machining line must be very reliable. It
must have high machine up-time, low scrap, and high quality. In designing a line that
met these high standards, the teams at US-Auto learned about many differences
between the traditional designs for machining lines they were familiar with, and how a
lean producer such as Toyota designs a machining line.
3.2 Machining Process Design
The work of designing the machining lines began by deciding on what machining
process would be used to turn the initial casting into the final part. The crankshaft team
did this by visiting many of the US-Auto engine plants, and those of other automakers,
as well as meeting with several machine tool builders. After determining proposed
machining sequences, the teams sent out request for quotes to the machine tool
suppliers.
The machine tool suppliers returned quotes to US-Auto within a month of receiving the
requests. The simultaneous engineering teams spent nearly four weeks reviewing the
bids and making a selection. The process was arduous because of the sheer volume of
documents (at least 10 large notebooks for the crankshaft line), and the numerous
details involved. The teams evaluated each supplier on the elements summarized in
Table 4, below.
Table 3 - Summary of Machine Tool Supplier Evaluation Criteria
Machines Type
Size
Number of spindles
Tooling type and change time
Types of Controls
Maintenance Reliability
Service and support in an emerging market country
Cost Initial cost of machine
Recurring tooling and maintenance costs
Support During Design of Process and Plant
The team ranked each supplier on each element, in particular, how the supplier would
support lean manufacturing. For example, the team sought suppliers that made small
machines that, which make the implementation of visual management easier. They also
sought machines that had common tooling that could be changed quickly - allowing an
operator to tend to several machines.
Once the teams selected the machine tool suppliers, the US-Auto teams (which included
manufacturing engineers, product design engineer, facilities engineers and
procurement), along with personnel from the machine tool companies, proceeded to
design the machining lines. These teams were called a simultaneous engineering
teams.
In designing the machining lines, the simultaneous engineering teams began with the
layout. By working with the Toyota experts, they quickly realized that a traditional layout
is substantially different than one used by Toyota. Table 4 - Implementation of Layout
Elements at Toyota, below, lists the layout elements with the most dramatic differences
in a Toyota plant compared to a traditional plant. Each element is described in detail in
the corresponding section listed in Table 5.
Table 4 - Implementation of Layout Elements at Toyota
Layout Out Element Implementation at Section
Toyota
Material flow through the Standardized flow of parts 3.2.1
factory
Distance between Close to minimize 3.2.2
machines operator walk path
Procedures for changing Decentralized tooling, in 3.2.3
perishable tooling process tool changes
Management of the Line Visual Management, 3.2.4
Andon Board
3.2.1 Standardized Flow of Parts
The new engine program began by designing the material flow for the entire plant, and
they designed the material flows within the lines. The three flows that were planned first
were: casting delivery (for the machining lines), component delivery (for the assembly
lines), and shipping of completed engines.
In designing the flow of material in the plant, the new engine program wanted to limit the
distances material flowed, and also limit the amount of forklift traffic in the plant. Forklifts
can be a work hazard, and require wider aisles for access.
The new engine program designed the plant so that castings (for the machining lines)
would be delivered to docks that were along one wall of the plant. At the opposite end of
the plant, all components for the assembly lines would be delivered. Thus, material
could be delivered closest to the point of use, eliminating the wastes of excess travel
and excess handling. See Figure 5 - US-Auto New Engine Program Plant Layout,
below.
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Figure 5 - US-Auto New Engine Program Plant Layout
The machining lines in the plant were designed so that they began near the plant wall to
which the castings would be delivered, and ended near the point the component was
needed on the assembly lines.
In comparison, some of the other US-Auto engine plants have a more jumbled flow.
They have a much wider spacing of aisles to accommodate the numerous forklifts that
transport material around the plant. Several traditional plants also have large material
storage areas for work in process or parts that need rework. This difference in flow can
be seen in the square footage comparison between a traditional plant and a lean plant,
as described Table 2 - Operational Targets for the New US-Auto Engine Plant, above.
3.2.2 Minimize Operator Walk Path.
In order to have a machining line in an engine plant that is run by 4-5 operators, the
operators' walk paths must be carefully thought out. In a mass production plant, with up
to 20 operators on one machining line, the line can be very spread out, because each
operator is responsible for only one or two pieces of equipment. In these traditional
mass production plants, operators are not required to cover much of the line, and have
jobs that are fairly stationary. In a Toyota line, the operators are in constant motion,
tending to six or eight machines. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the impact of a lean
production system on an operator.)
The implications are that the machining layout in a lean production plant must be
designed to minimize the operator walk paths. To minimize the operator walk path in a
machining department, the machine tools must be located as close as possible to each
other. Aisles within departments should be narrow. Toyota's aisles within machining
departments are 3m wide or less, aisles between departments are 4m wide.
A concern that some may have with narrow aisles within a machining department is
access for major repairs. Traditionally, if a machine tool needs substantial repair, and
large components requiring removal, a forklift is brought into the department. Toyota
has recognized that this type of failure is rare, and it is not necessary to design the
machining lines so that a forklift can enter them. If heavy lifting is required within a
Toyota line for a repair, forklifts are not used. Instead, they use winches that attach to
the c-channel roof trusses that the plant was designed with15. US-Auto decided not to
invest in a roof that would sustain the loads that lifting from the trusses would create.
Instead, the plant intends to use "cherry picker" type lifts from the main aisles to reach
into the machining lines when necessary.
The choice of aisle width may initially appear to be only a minor point in the overall
design of the engine plant, but it is an excellent example of how the principles of the
Toyota Production System impact all aspects of designs, even elements which may
seem inconsequential. In a traditional engine plant operator walk paths are usually do
not impact the operation of the line. In a Toyota plant, an operator is responsible for six
to eight machines tools, and is constantly walking between all the tools. With this much
travel, minimizing the operator walk path becomes an important factor in effective line
operation.
Once the aisle width had been determined, the team focused on how the machines
would be oriented in the department. As Shingo states, "...as much as possible,
equipment should be laid out around the outside of the chosen pattern and workers
stationed on the inside, both to reduce isolation and to facilitate mutual assistance12. "
This statement has two implications for machining lines. First, that machine tools should
be positioned such that the main access points are towards the inner aisles, thus the
operators will not have to walk around the machine as much when performing their
tasks. The second is worker isolation, which is discussed below.
When designing the layout of the line, it is important to avoid designs that "isolate" a
worker. If the machining line is to run with 4-5 people, each team member must be free
to respond to any area of the line where help is needed. In the case of the crankshaft,
the initial layout was as shown in Figure 7, below. This design would have required one
worker to be permanently stationed in the lower section of the line. It would also create
a long walk path to the work at the very end of the line.
A better design is shown in Figure 8. This has brought all the machines as closely
together as possible and eliminated the isolated worker.
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Figure 6 - Line Design that Isolates Figure 7 - Line Design that Does Not Isolate
When designing the layout, Toyota allows a great deal of time for revising it. Design the
layout of a machining line may easily take more than one month. US-Auto also spent a
month designing the machining lines. This time was spent seeking input from
consultants, other engine programs, and the machine tool suppliers. Over the course of
this month, the crankshaft team revised their line layout 70-80 times. Some changes
were to improve the visual management of the line, others were to improve the operator
walk paths, and others were to place additional items - such as the department's tool
change area.
It is because of the necessary attention to detail that designing a lean production system
required a large number of manufacturing engineers. In order to assure that the design
is as optimal as possible, the teams must be give adequate resources and time.
3.2.3 Decentralized Tooling
When the US-Auto Simultaneous Engineering teams designed the machining lines, they
simultaneously planned how the tooling would be replaced on the line. In an engine
machining plant, "tooling" refers to the parts of the machine that wear routinely and need
frequent replacement, such as drills, reams, taps, inserts, and hones.
In a traditional US-Auto engine plant, these tools are changed in "blocks." Block
changes mean all tools on a machine are changed at once, regardless of wear, usually
between shifts. The purpose of block tool changes is to minimize the downtime of the
line during production hours. The tool changes are usually done by a tooling department
that serves the entire plant. This department does all the re-grinding as well as set-up of
all tooling. This is a "centralized" tooling approach.
Alternatively, in a Toyota machining line, operators are responsible for performing simple
tool changes, and tool setup throughout their shift. To facilitate this, machining lines in
Toyota engine plants each contain a small tool set-up area. In this area the operators
for the line set-up all drills, taps and reamers that are used on the line. Counters on the
machine tools are connected to the andon board to signal (described in section
3.2.4 Machining Line Andon) when a tool change is coming up. This is a
"decentralized" tooling approach.
In addition to the tooling areas in the departments, a Toyota plant has a centralized
tooling department that serves the entire plant. This centralized tooling group is
responsible for setting up complex tooling such as broaches, hones, and grinding wheel.
It is also in charge of sharpening the drills, taps and reamers used by the departments.
This centralized tool group is the only group in the plant that is allowed to purchase new
tooling.
Both the centralized method of tool changes, and the decentralized method have
benefits. They are listed in Table 5 - Comparison of Tool Change Methods, below.
Table 5 - Comparison of Tool Change Methods
Benefits of Centralized Benefits of Decentralized
Experienced workers are performing Tools are sharpened when they get dull,
all tool set-ups not before, not after.
Minimal fixed cost investment in tool Ownership of tooling by line operators -
height gauges. helps the operators notice changes in
machinery and trouble shoot problems
Less space required in plant.
Toyota has found that the benefits of decentralized tooling are much stronger than the
benefits of centralized tooling. The biggest advantage of decentralized tooling is that it is
a better facilitator of Kaizen, or continuous improvement. If an operator in the machining
line is performing the tool changes, they will note when a machine is experiencing
abnormal tool wear and be able to troubleshoot the problem much more quickly then a
traditional centralized tooling person (who is also responsible for many other lines in the
plant) would.
The tool change procedure is another example of layout that has far reaching
implications in the Toyota Production System. Because the tool changes will be done by
the operators during the shifts, US-Auto had to carefully place the tooling benches and
racks within the lines. They have to be easy for the operators to access, yet not be in
the way of the operators' walk paths. The machine tools must be positioned and
designed so that an operator can quickly open them, perform a tool change, and restart
them. Appendix 3: Tool Change Procedure, describes the procedure in detail.
3.2.4 Machining Line Andon Board
One of the most significant differences between a machining line in a Toyota plant and
one in a typical US-Auto plant is how the operators know what to do throughout their
work day. In current US-Auto engine plants, the operators are assigned to a station by
their supervisor. They commonly work at the same station all day. If another part of the
line has a problem during the day and needs additional help, the supervisor will reassign
operators to that area.
In a Toyota engine plant machining line, operators work on all parts of the machining
line. The operators refer to the andon board throughout the day to know what to work on
next. Team leaders do not assign the operator to areas, or tell them what to do during
the day. The andon board sets the workers' priorities. The entire machining line is
managed by the andon board. Andon means lantern in Japanese1'. Each of the
machining lines has one andon board. The board is of relatively simple construction - it
consists of light bulbs behind colored Plexiglas. See Figure 8 - Machining Line Andon
Board, below.
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Figure 8 -Machining Line Andon Board
The location of the andon board on the line is critical - operators must be able to see it
from all parts of the department. If it is not visible, alternative methods must be found for
helping the operators see the board. On some Toyota lines, monitors connected to
cameras pointed at the andon board are used to project the andon board into areas
where the board itself is not visible.
In a machining line, each station is connected to the andon board. The machines have
been designed with autonomation, which is the ability for the machine to stop
automatically when it detects a failure16. Autonomation has also been described as
"...the autonomous check of the abnormal in a process11." Thus, when a machine needs
an operator's attention, an andon light is lit, and an operator responds.
The lights on the andon board have different colors and correspondingly different
meanings. See Figure 9 - Andon Light Meanings, below.
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Figure 9 - Andon Light Meanings
As can be seen from the andon light meanings above, there are many different reasons
that andon lights turn on. Appendix 4 contains a detailed description of andon boards
and their operation.
Although the importance of an andon board does not become evident until the plant is
operational, it is important for the simultaneous engineering teams to understand the
operation of the andon board before the line is designed. The machine tools that are
selected must be capable of sending the appropriate outputs to the andon board. The
board must be in a location that is visible to the entire line. Conversely, in traditional
machining lines, the output from the individual machines is less critical, it is common for
the machines to have separate displays that are not linked.
3.3 Crankshaft Specific Learnings
The lessons learned from the US-Auto new engine program that have been discussed
thus far apply to all machining lines. Through working closely with the crankshaft team,
the author also became knowledgeable in crankshaft specific issues. This section will
begin with an overview of the crankshaft, and then discuss how US-Auto evaluated the
new crankshaft, and will end with a detailed discussion of one of the notable differences
between a Toyota crankshaft and a typical US-Auto crankshafts - tolerancing.
Figure 10 - Illustration of a Crankshaft, below, depicts a typical crankshaft. US-Auto
receives a casting from a supplier, which is machined into the net shape show below.
Much of the machining is done on either end of the crankshaft, and at the journal
bearings.
Bearings
/11 Awnk
Figure 10 - Illustration of a Crankshaft
3.3. 1 Process Design PFMEA
Once the machine tool suppliers were selected, and had developed preliminary designs
the crankshaft team reviewed the proposals for the entire line. The review was an
opportunity for all involved to carefully examine the entire plan and look for potential
problems. The method used for reviewing the crankshaft process was the PFMEA.
According to the PFMEA guide that was prepared by all of the Big Three, "...a Process
Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (PFMEA) is an analytical technique utilized
by a Manufacturing Responsible Engineer/Team as a means to assure that, to the extent
possible, potential failure modes and their associated causes/mechanisms have been
considered and addressed.7 "
The PFMEA processes consists of documenting all of the potential failures for each
operation in the machining line. For each failure, an associated cause, current process,
and recommended action are documented. Then each failure is ranked on severity,
I
occurrence, and detectability. Finally, these rankings are multiplied together and result
in an overall risk priority number. See Figure 11 - PFMEA Example, below. The risk
priority number allows the team to prioritize the order in which all of the potential failures
on the line are addressed.
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Figure 11 - PFMEA Example
The crankshaft team began the PFMEA process as soon as the machine tool suppliers
were all selected. At this early phase there is the most opportunity to make changes to
the designs, as has been discussed in section 1.1 Research Introduction, above.
Examples of the changes made to the designs as a result of the PFMEA process are
described below.
The crankshaft PFMEA was conducted in a three-day workshop format. The team
consisted of:
- representatives from all machine tool suppliers
- tool representative
- crankshaft advanced manufacturing engineers
- crankshaft product engineer
- supervisors of crankshaft line that is currently in production
- retiree that has been in crankshaft supervision for many years
- retiree that has been engine engineering in engine plant for 20+ years.
In the workshop, each machine tool supplier presented the complete proposed process
for machining a particular stage of the crankshaft. After each stage was described, the
team used the PFMEA form to document all of the potential failure modes for that stage.
The team found that it was helpful to have as much information about current design on
hand as possible. This includes part drawings, machine tool drawings, proposed
layouts, and prototype models.
Reviewing the entire crankshaft process took three days. This was time well spent. The
process resulted in several savings and improvements. Three key results of the
crankshaft PFMEA workshop are described below:
3.3.1.1 Eliminated an Operation
The PFMEA workshop reviewed and carefully questioned each operation that was
planned for the crankshaft machining line. In the workshop, the team decided that one
of the planned deburr operations would not be needed. Initially, the machine tool
supplier planned this operation because they felt that the previous process may create
burrs that needed to be removed. The experts from the engine plants stated that burrs
rarely occur on the surface in question. The machine tool builder of the next operation
stated that the next machining process would also remove any burrs that may exist.
Thus, the team decided to eliminate the deburring machine. Eliminating this operation
reduced the cost of the crankshaft line by $500,000.
3.3.1.2 Identified Potential Sources of Defects
In reviewing each process, the team also reviewed how the crankshaft would be handled
between operations. One of the machine tool suppliers had planned to transfer the
crankshaft by lifting it by the bearing surface. This surface would have been machined
in a previous step. The team members that had spent many years working in the US-
Auto engine plants were concerned about this method of transfer. These bearing
surfaces have close tolerances and are easily damaged, and the downstream operations
would not be capable of removing any nicks or scratches to these surfaces. As a result
of the workshop, the machine tool supplier redesigned the method of transferring the
crankshaft between operations, eliminating handling as a source of bearing defects.
3.3.1.3 Eliminated Special Tooling
As has been stated, the PFMEA workshop reviewed each operation in detail, including
the tooling. The team identified a few instances in which the machine tool suppliers had
planned to use specialized inserts. These specialized inserts are usually custom made
for the application, rather than being a standard catalog part. This customization
increases the costs of the tools, and makes it harder to find alternative sources for the
tooling. US-Auto's goal was to have no special tooling on the new engine program.
Thus, the crankshaft team worked closely with the machine tool and tooling suppliers to
eliminate the special tooling. See Figure 12 - Changing from Special Tooling to
Standard Tooling, for an example.
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Figure 12 -Changing from Special Tooling to Standard Tooling
Conducting the PFMEA as soon as the suppliers were selected was an unusual move
for US-Auto. Traditionally, the PFMEA has been done at the end of the project, and has
served to document potential problems on the line, and how to work around them. If a
PFMEA is done this late in the project it is very difficult to revise the machines to
eliminate the potential failures that are found. By conducting the PFMEA at the
beginning of the process, US-Auto was able to raise many concerns and allow the
machine tool suppliers ample time to address the concerns. By eliminating potential
failures early, the machining line will be more reliable. This increased reliability will allow
US-Auto to achieve the low Toyota level of staffing, 4-5 operators per line.
The early PFMEA review also enhances all of the simultaneous engineering team
activities. As has been stated, US-Auto purchased machine tools from several different
suppliers and managed the integration of the machines. The PFMEA meeting allowed
all of the machine tool builders to see the other operations in the machining line, and ask
as many questions as they wanted to about the details. This knowledge at the beginning
of the machine tool design process allowed the builders to start sharing information early
and provided a sufficient window to revise their designs as required.
3.3.2 Tolerancing
In addition to reviewing how the crankshaft would be made, using the PFMEA process,
the crankshaft team also reviewed the crankshaft design - this was done with the help of
the Toyota Production System consultants that US-Auto hired. In particular, the
tolerances were reviewed. Tightness of critical tolerances is important to the overall
production system. These tolerances drive quality, scrap, machining time, gauging time,
and tooling costs.
In the product development phase, it is important to evaluate each tolerance to
understand its impact on the production system. A review of the US-Auto new engine
crankshaft component drawing found that most tolerances were very close to Toyota's
with the exception of tapped holes, which are discussed below. Additional differences
were in how Toyota compensates for the tolerances that are held in machining.
3.3.2.1 Selective Fit of Main Bearings
Toyota understands that there is variation in the machining, and has found a way to
adjust the design for the variation in manufacturing. For example, on the crankshaft, one
of the key tolerances is the main bearings. How close these tolerances are have a great
impact on NVH (Noise, Vibration, & Harshness).
Toyota selective fits main engine bearings. Selective fitting means that for each engine
the assemblers select main bearing shells that correspond to the dimensions of the
machined components, i.e. the crankshaft and the engine block. This selective fitting
results in bearings have a tighter fir than could have been achieved without the selective
fitting.
The selective fitting is done on the production line by measuring both the finished
diameters of main bearings on crankshaft, as well as the crank bore diameter on the
block. These diameters are ranked into three categories: 0.000 to 0.005 ; 0.005 to
0.010; 0.010 to 0.015. In final engine assembly process, five different main bearing
shell types are used to selectively fit to the tolerance of the block and crankshaft of each
engine. The results of this selective fit process are a substantial reduction in NVH from
a loose fitting crankshaft.
The selective fit of main bearings is an example of how product engineering and
manufacturing engineering need to communicate very early in the design process about
tolerances. The product engineers need to understand what tolerances can be held by
the machining departments, and the manufacturing engineers need to be aware of the
design requirements. Although Toyota manufacturing engineers have undoubtedly
made many improvements to the process of manufacturing the main bearings, the NVH
requirements could not be met by one bearing design. Thus the product design
engineers created five different bearing types. Executing the selective fit of main
bearings requires substantial planning on the part of both the product design engineers,
and the manufacturing engineers.
US-Auto has does not selectively fit main bearings. Although the product engineering
organization has attempted to pursue it on previous programs, it has been very difficult
for advanced manufacturing engineering to accomplish. This may be related to US-
Auto's historically delegating much of the manufacturing engineering to the machine tool
suppliers. Additionally, it has only been in the last five years that product design
engineers have begun working closely with the process design engineers at US-Auto.
Both engineering groups are still establishing and understanding of each others'
processes. At this point, both product design engineering and manufacturing engineering
feel that selectively fitting main engine bearings will be too difficult to execute. The
process require deciding on what possible bearing combinations are possible - which
requires a very good understanding of the tolerance capabilities of the machine tools. In
production, selective fit requires that each engine block and crankshaft are measured,
and that the final assembly line use the two measurements to determine the correct
bearing shell size to use between the two.
3.3.2.2 Tapped Hole Tolerances
Another tolerancing opportunity that the US-Auto new engine program found was in
tapped hole depth. Typical US-Auto hole tap depth tolerances were within a half of a
thread pitch, while Toyota uses 1-2 threads. Very different gauge types and times are
required to check to these different tolerances. To check a half thread pitch a thread
gauge that is screwed into the hole must be used. To check to a tolerance of 1-2
threads, Toyota uses a hook gauge that the operator places into the tapped hole,
hooked the last thread in the hole, and then visually compared the top of the hole to
make sure it is within the green mark on the hook gauge. The hook gauge may take a
few seconds to use, while the other gauge may take 30 seconds to use.
Both of the tolerancing learnings described above occurred because US-Auto hired a
consultant who was very familiar with the details of the Toyota product and process
design. This expert, along with the manufacturing engineers on the program, had
recurring meetings with product design engineers to review all of the component part
tolerances. In reaction to these meetings, the chief engineer on the program
commented, "I'm excited about this - because in the past we have not done a very good
job at this and have never had [a manufacturing engineer] around to talk to about this."
3.4 Conclusions from Machining Line Design
The supplier selection process used on the new engine program was very different from
the traditionally used by US-Auto. US-Auto typically outsources the entire line to one
supplier. That supplier was then given the responsibility of designing the entire line and
installing it in the plant. Traditionally, US-Auto manufacturing engineers only supplied
specifications for the whole line, and managed the interfaces between the lines.
The new engine program wanted the machining lines to implement the principles of the
Toyota Production System, and to gain better control over the costs of the entire lines.
To accomplish these tasks, US-Auto hired a large number of manufacturing engineers.
The engineers took on the task of designing the lines, selecting each machine tool on
the line, and integrating the machine tools together to create machining lines.
For this extra investment in manufacturing engineers, US-Auto received a great benefit.
Many details of the plant were carefully designed to implement the principles of the
Toyota Production System. By choosing each machine for the machining lines, US-
Auto was able to select from several suppliers and choose the exact machine that fit
their needs. US-Auto achieved significant savings on the machining lines though this
selection process, as well as assuming the project management tasks for the machining
lines.
In addition to the immediate savings on the machines tools, the additional manufacturing
engineers were also able to design a plant that implement the principles of the Toyota
Production System. The benefits of the new production system are additional savings
that will have to evaluated once the plant is operational.
4 Final Assembly Line
The final assembly line in an engine plant completes the assembly of the engine. This
usually includes assembling the 5C's (cylinder block, cylinder head, crankshaft, cam
shafts, connecting rods), and installing additional components such as the gaskets, oil
pan, accessory dives, and wiring. The final assembly line is the most labor-intensive line
in the plant. Most of the stations consist of an operator installing components by hand,
or with the assistance of a machine that tightens down several bolts at once.
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Figure 13 - Illustration of an Assembled Automobile Engine
The final assembly line also contains a test area that tests the performance of the
engine. These tests are designed to detect leaks and components that are
malfunctioning - both electrical and mechanical.
This chapter will discuss implementing lean manufacturing in an engine assembly line. It
will begin by describing the process the engine assembly team used to research
potential engine assembly line designs, followed by a description of the design of the
new US-Auto engine assembly line, as well as the lessons the team learned in designing
the line.
The final assembly line was designed by a simultaneous engineering team. The team
members were manufacturing engineers, test engines, product design engines, and
procurement specialists.
4.1 Benchmarking
Before designing the 1.6 L engine assembly line, the team benchmarked engine plants
all over the world. After which the assembly line team went through the process of
designing an preliminary process and line layout. Then, five potential suppliers were
then individually shown the assembly concept, and invited to comment on it. These
suppliers proved to be an additional source of benchmarking information. Several of the
suppliers offered improvement suggestions, and gave the team tours of engine plants
that were using the equipment the supplier was suggesting for the line. These additional
benchmarking visits resulted in many changes to the initial line concept.
4.2 Process Design
The purpose of the benchmarking stage is to determine the best practices in engine
assembly. After thoroughly studying many different engine assembly lines, the
assembly team proceeded to design the engine assembly line. The design of the line
was based on the principles of the Toyota Production System. This section will describe
the final engine assembly line concept that the team created.
4.2.1 Line Layout
There are several key elements that can be found in the Toyota Production System final
engine assembly line that are not found in US-Auto's traditional final engine assembly
lines. These elements are synchronous line advancement, continuous loop design,
specialized material handling, and visual management. Each of these elements are
described in detail in the sections below.
4.2.1.1 Synchronous vs. Asynchronous
One of the initial decisions in designing the line is the how the engine will advance from
one station to another as it is being assembled. There are two primary options for
advancing the engine: asynchronous and synchronous.
All existing US-Auto engine plants have asynchronous final assembly lines. An
asynchronous line can also be described as one that "stops in station." On this type of
final engine assembly line the engine moves into the station, stops in the station while
the operator assembles components onto the engine, and then moves to the next
station.
An alternative to an asynchronous line is a synchronous line. Toyota's final engine
assembly lines are all synchronous. A synchronous line is continuously moving. In the
case of engine assembly, the engine proceeds slowly though the workstation while the
operator assembles components to the engine. A yellow line is painted in the station at
the point at which the engine is 2 /3r of the way through the station. At the end of the
station is a red line.
In designing a final assembly line, the line advancement methodology must be one of
the first decisions that is made. The advancement method determines many other
aspects of the line, including how far apart each work station is, how material handling
will supply each work station, how equipment will be located within the cell, and how
much room is needed for the final assembly line.
There are many benefits of the synchronous line. They are summarized in the table
below, and are explained in greater detail in the following sections. The reader should
also look at chapter 5 of this thesis for a discussion of concerns that have been
expressed with implementing this type of line, and recommendations of how to
overcome these concerns.
Table 6 - Summary of the Benefits of a Synchronous Line
* Visual Management - can better observe completion of engine
* Pacing - operator's pace is clearly defined, can observe if
operator is capable working at pace
* Training and assistance- room for a second person for training,
or assisting with a problem
* Inventory staging - can better stage parts in order of use, parts
can be staged closer to line
* Management of operators - much fewer time-management
issues; line helps manage employees
Synchronous Line Benefit #1: Visual Management
With an asynchronous line, it is difficult to tell, through a few minutes of observation, if an
operator is having trouble completing an engine within the takt time. (Takt time is the
time it takes to produce one engine 12.) If an operator is not able to complete all of the
steps on an engine it is not seen until the end of the cycle when the engine fails to move
on to the next position.
With a synchronous line, visual management is much easier. If an operator is falling
behind on an engine, it will be visible that the engine has moved further down the line
without having enough work done to it. This is particularly noticeable as the engine
passes the yellow 2/3rds completion mark in the station.
Synchronous Line Benefit #2: Pacing
In addition to observing the movement of the engine, it is also easy to judge the progress
of the engine by observing the operator. The operator should be moving through the
work area at a rhythmic pace. If the operator is rushing to get to the next engine, it is an
indication of problems in the work area. It may mean that the line is not balanced, and
that too much work has been assigned to the station, or it may mean that the operator
requires additional training.
Note: the operator's return path to the engine is not wasted. Typically parts for the next
engine are picked up as the operator approaches the new engine.
With an asynchronous line, the operator potentially will not know that he/she is behind
until the engine pops out of the station - a light serves as a visual indicator that the
engine will move, but a busy operator may not notice this signal. Thus, the operator
must pace him/her-self by getting accustomed to the takt time, and does not have a
visual way of know how long the engine has been in the station.
Synchronous Line Benefit #3: Assisting the Operator
In an asynchronous line, the workstations are placed closer together, and only one
person can occupy the station at a time. The stations are closer together because
operators are not walking along the line to install parts, but are standing in one location.
Thus, the stations are compact, and have all of the necessary inventory grouped closely
around the operator.
The wider synchronous station allows two people to occupy the station at once. This
benefits both training and problem correction. With a wide line, a trainer can work side
by side with the operator and teach them to perform the job. If an operator runs into a
problem and cannot complete an engine within the takt time, the wider line allows the
team leader to work next to the team member and fix the current engine, or begin the
next engine.
Conversely, in a narrow, asynchronous line, there is no room for an additional person on
the line. All training is done off of the line in a special training area. And if problems
arise at the station it is much more likely that the line will stop.
Synchronous Line Benefit #4: Inventory Staging
The wider stations of the synchronous line allow for better inventory staging. Parts are
staged so that the operator picks up parts while walking along the line. On the return
path to the beginning of the station, the operator also picks up the parts that will be used
at the beginning of the station. This type of inventory staging defines a standard order in
which the parts are installed on every engine; and also helps the operator develop the
rhythm of doing the standard operating procedure. Both of these factors reduce the
probability of mis-builds, and facilitate operator training.
In an asynchronous line, all of the inventory is staged around the operator. Although the
parts are staged in a logical sequence, it is much easier for an operator to use another
assembly sequence that may be less optimal than the designed sequence. This can
cause problems in trouble shooting, or in knowing where to start installing parts again
after then engine line has stopped for a prolonged period of time.
Synchronous Line Benefit #5: Management of Operators
The asynchronous line is equipped with switches that allow the line to be stopped if the
engine is not completed within the takt time. These switches have the potential of being
misused around break times to stop the line early, lengthening the break period, and
preventing the line from restarting immediately after the break.
In a synchronous line, the engine does not stop for at a break period until it reaches the
end of a station. If there is a problem with the engine, an andon light will be on. The
operator and team leader do not leave the area until the andon is resolved. At the
conclusion of a break period, the line is immediately restarted. If an operator does not
return promptly from break, he will not be able to complete the engine within the takt
time and will have to pull the andon cord. This will alert the team leader that there is a
problem in that area. When the team leader responds to the andon, it will be evident
that the root cause of the problem is attendance.
At Toyota's Georgetown, Kentucky facility, an andon pull after a break that is caused by
an employee being late results in an absence on the employee's attendance record. The
facility has an annual lottery in which 10 new Toyota Camerys are given away. Only
employees with perfect attendance are entered into the lottery. Thus, the absence from
being late from a break removes an operator from being eligible for the lottery.
Thus, in a synchronous line is designed so that little management of the operators is
necessary because there is little ambiguity in job responsibilities. The supervisor of an
asynchronous line typically faces more time-management issues.
The reader should be cautioned that a poor implementation of the Toyota Production
System can give the workforce a very negative impression of the system. Many of
benefits of the synchronous line listed above have been identified as sources of great
concern by some workers, particularly the United Auto Workers' (UAW) union. A book
on this subject, Choosing Sides, Unions and the Team Concept 24, describes the Toyota
Production System as a Management by Stress system. According to the book, the
system uses stress to serve as a force to drive and regulate the system. The source of
these concerns, and methods to alleviate the concerns can be found in Section 5 of this
thesis.
The synchronous/asynchronous final assembly line was not an easy decision for the US-
Auto new engine program. Many of the members of the program with extensive engine
manufacturing experience had only worked on asynchronous lines, and wanted to install
a line type that they were familiar with. The consultants with extensive Toyota
experience strongly discouraged the possibility of an asynchronous design. The new
engine program spent many weeks studying and benchmarking synchronous line
designs before concluding that the benefits listed above were the reason to build a
synchronous final assembly line.
This is another example of why it is necessary to invest in a large number of
manufacturing engineers when implementing the principles of the Toyota Production
System. It would have been very difficult for the senior management on the project to
accept the synchronous line design without knowing that the line had been extensively
studied, and the benefits were clearly understood. Without the enough engineers to do
the research, US-Auto would have very likely implemented a traditional asynchronous
line, and would not have gotten any of the synchronous line benefits described above.
The expertise also led to a better overall plant design. The relation between the
machining lines and the final assembly line has been very carefully designed.
Historically, the lines are designed independently and then connected with the required
amount of conveyor.
4.2.1.2 Loop Conveyor & Pallet Design
The US-Auto new engine final engine assembly line was designed with a loop conveyor.
In this design, the end of the line is very close to the beginning of the line. As a result,
very little additional conveyor is required to return the engine assembly pallets back to
the beginning of the line.
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Figure 14 - Engine Final Assembly Line Layout
Traditionally, US-Auto has built final engine assembly lines that are straight lines. With a
straight line, it is possible to place workers on either side of the line, and store more
inventory on the line. This design requires a duplicate length of conveyor to return the
pallets to the beginning of the line. It also requires more pallets because more will be in
transit back to the beginning of the line.
The assembly team felt that they did not need extra space on the line to store
components parts, and that material access was only necessary from one side of the
line. Thus, the team went with a loop design for the final assembly line that did not
require the additional return conveyor. The estimate the cost savings, from less
conveyor length and a fewer number of pallets, to be nearly $500,000.
The assembly team also wanted to eliminate the rotating sections of conveyor. These
sections rotate the engine so that the operator can work on either the sides or back of
the engine. They are an additional source of cost and maintenance requirements on
the line. The team worked with the assembly line suppliers to design an engine pallet
that would allow the engine to rotate about both a horizontal axis on a trunnion, and a
vertical axis on a Lazy Susan type device. This pallet will also have a parts tray
attached to it which contains component parts that the operators assemble to the
engine.
The loop conveyor for the pallets will be mounted on the factory floor, eliminating the
need for a trench in the floor to keep the conveyor mechanism below the floor level. The
conveyor mechanisms will be approximately 10", which allows easy access to the inside
of the line in case the operators need additional help. Keeping the mechanism above
the floor saves on the cost of putting a trench in the floor. It also makes it easier to
access the conveyor to perform maintenance on it.
4.2.1.3 Proposed Material Handling Concept
The delivery of components to the final assembly line was another key aspect of
designing the final assembly line. Since there were many different issues and
alternatives to discuss, the assembly team conducted a UPS Workshop on material
Handling. A UPS Workshop is a 2 to 5 day activity in which a large cross-functional
group meets away from the office environment to resolve an issue.18
In the workshop the assembly team defined how components will be received by the
plant, how components will be transported to the line, and how components will be
handled on the line.
Since this plant will be located in an emerging market, frequent, small lot size deliveries
from suppliers are cost prohibitive because of the shipping costs involved. Instead,
component parts will be shipped in sea containers to a warehouse that is adjacent to the
plant. This warehouse will "deconsolidate" (unload) the sea containers. This "decon
center" will receive all purchased parts that are used on the assembly line. The
deconsolidation center will also transport components to the assembly line.
In the material handling workshop, the team also defined how parts will be delivered to
the operator on the line' 9. The team grouped the parts into four categories:
Small components that will be stored line side.
Bolts, dowels, washers, clips
Medium components that can be placed on the engine pallet parts tray,
or hung on hooks on the tray
Timing chain components, water outlet, oil filter, damper, fuel rail
Large components that will be delivered in special kits
Kit #1: Valve cover & Oil Pan, Kit #2: Exhaust Manifold & Intake Manifold
Fragile components that will be stored line side
Bearings, gaskets, fuel injectors, pumps
Material handling personnel will be responsible for supplying the line from the
deconsolidation center. For small and fragile components that are stored line side, a
two hour stock or less will be kept at the line. Large parts will be delivered directly to the
line.
Medium sized parts will be supplied to the line using a line-side market concept that the
assembly team developed. "...The line-side market is an area on the assembly line in
which engine components will be stored (in two hour or less increments), and loaded to
a tray on the engine assembly pallet19." As can be seen in Figure 14 - Engine Final
Assembly Line Layout, above, there are plans for five line-side markets on the 1.6L final
engine assembly line.
In each of these markets, a material handling operator will be responsible for loading the
proper parts for a specific engine onto the engine pallet that is being used to build that
engine20 . Because different engines require different components, an radio frequency
(R/F) tag on the engine pallet is used to signal which engine is being built. When the
pallet enters the market, the R/F tag is read electronically, and signal the material
handling operator which parts to pick for that engine by turning on lights, opening
selected bins, and activating light curtains. The operator will then place the components
in specific locations on the engine pallet parts tray, or the hooks on the tray.
In comparison, a traditional US-Auto plant will have at least a four hour stock of
components at the line. Many times the components are delivered by forklifts in the
large tubs the supplier sent them it. The operators on the final assembly line have to
reach and search for many of the components during the final assembly process.
The traditional US-Auto material handling method takes a lot less time to design in
comparison to the method developed by the new engine program. Because the new
engine program had a hire staffing level of manufacturing engineers, the program was
able to dedicate the time in advance to carefully design the material handling methods,
making the final assembly line more efficient.
4.2.1.4 Other Methods of Material Handling
The line-side market system is most like a system that is used by Honda. There are
some significant differences between the system that the US-Auto new engine program
assembly team is proposing and the Toyota Production System, as well as the traditional
US-Auto method of delivering component parts to the engine final assembly line.
In most US-Auto engine plants, components are delivered to the final assembly line in
large bins by a fork lift. It is the responsibility of the material handling people to know
what components need to be restocked when on the line.
Toyota uses a kanban system to supply components to the engine final assembly line.
A two hour stock of component parts is kept on racks at the line. The stations are very
similar to those in the US-Auto new engine plant. Kanban cards are used to order more
parts. When an operator begins using a new box of parts, he or she first removes the
kanban card from the box. This card is placed in a kanban mailbox that is nearby on the
parts rack. Several times a day the team leader gathers the kanban cards from the
operators and places them in a kanban collection box for the line. Material handling
personnel pick up these kanban cards from each line several times a day, sort them, and
replenish parts based on the cards.21
If there is a choice of what type of component goes on a specific engine, the racks at
Toyota are equipped with light curtains. A system on the engine pallet reads what type
of engine is being built, and triggers the appropriate light curtain to change color. If the
operator breaks the wrong light curtain, a warning will sound until the proper curtain is
broken.
The US-Auto new engine program is deviating from the Toyota Production System
method of material handling on the final assembly line by using the pallets and line side
markets concept. This concept stores inventory at the market locations, and not
throughout the line. The markets stock trays for each engine. Conversely, in the Toyota
Production System, inventory is stored at the side of the line.
The final assembly team's goal in designing the new material handling concept was to
eliminate the potential of misbuilds. In benchmarking various engine facilities around the
world, the assembly team learned that the biggest source of rejected engine is a mis-
build condition. (A mis-build occurs when a component for the wrong model of engine is
assembled onto the engine.) This new US-Auto engine is intended for use in three very
different vehicles. This has resulted in a large number of possible engine configurations
that the final assembly line will be responsible for building. The team felt that the line
side market concept would reduce the potential for mis-builds of all of the potential
configurations.
4.2.1.5 Evaluating the New Engine Program Material Handling Method
The benefits of the line-side market approach are that it reduces the number of people
that have to select components that are unique to an engine, thus decreasing the
likelihood of mis-builds. It also reduces the number of read/write devices required on the
line. The amount of storage containers and material handling traffic along the line will
also be reduced. 20
The most significant concern with the line-side market concept is that the operator does
not have close access to the parts if there is a problem. To get help with a parts
problem, the operator will have to pull the andon cord and ask the team leader to supply
another part and investigate the parts problem. 19 Although this will quickly raise the
problem of a bad part to the attention of management on the line, it could easily result in
unnecessary line stoppages for non recurring, special causes of defective parts.
In contrast, Toyota stocks two hours worth of components at the side of the final
assembly line and uses a kanban system to restock the component parts. One of the
fundamental principles of the kanban system is that it enables employees to operate the
Toyota Production System by taking responsibility for managing their own jobs. By
using the kanban system, the operator is assuming an important task of the
"management function" of ordering parts and managing inventory.21 The material
handling system devised by the new engine program requires more involvement by the
team leaders compared to the Toyota Production System. The US-Auto new engine
program will have to put extra effort into assuring that the final assembly operators feel
ownership and responsibility for helping solve parts problems, rather than only relying on
the team leader to solve parts problems.
The team defined the material handling concepts before releasing the request for quote
to its potential suppliers. Traditionally, material handling for assembly has been defined
by the company that is building the final assembly line. By defining material handling
early, the assembly team was able to release a very detailed description of the material
handling methods to the potential suppliers. This resulted in detailed quotes that are less
likely to change as the project progresses. The team was able to take the time to
prepare the detailed material handling concepts because of the high level of staffing of
manufacturing engineers on the new engine program.
The cost of spending the extra time on designing the material handling concept in detail
relatively early in the project will result in a savings in change orders later in the project.
(Revising the design of the line after the contract has been signed usually involves
creating an addendum to the contract. This addendum is a change order, and the
suppliers commonly charge to implement change orders.) Usually change orders are
needed because systems were not thought out in enough detail prior to signing a
contract. The new engine program went through many iterations of the material
handling concept before selecting a supplier.
In addition to saving the costs of change orders, the reduced need to change the
material handling concept will allow the supplier to better adhere to the quoted schedule,
rather than having to do extra work for change orders. Thus, the early definition of the
material handling concept will also help the project stay on schedule.
Having the material handling defined early also allowed other groups to act on that
information. One group that needs to understand material handling very early in the
project is the team that is designing the deconsolidation center. A relatively early
definition of material handling requirements is also beneficial to the component suppliers
as they design their dunnage (shipping materials).
The US-Auto new engine program will have to be very careful in implementing this new
material handling system. Elements of it have been tried in other plants, but no plant
currently uses the pallet and line side market system that has been proposed. US-Auto
must carefully think out all of the details of the schedule, training, and support processes
for this new type of material handling method. Fortunately, US-Auto can use the high
level of manufacturing engineering staffing to carefully follow through on the details of
implementing the new material handling system.
4.2.1.6 Visual Management
The engine final assembly line has been designed to be easy to manage visually. There
are several characteristics of the line that facilitate this visual management, including the
synchronous flow, loop shape, and use of an andon board. The benefits of synchronous
flow are described in detail in section
4.2.1.1 Synchronous vs. Asynchronous, above. The loop shape of the assembly line
makes it shorter and easier to see from one end to the other. Additionally, the team
required all of the utilities, especially power panels, to be located in the middle of the
loop, and to be less than 1m high. This makes it possible to see across this line. The
final assembly line will have an andon board that will manage all of the work on the line.
All of these elements of the final assembly line facilitate visual management of the final
assembly line. However, each element requires extensive study and planning to be
done properly. It was through investment in additional manufacturing engineers and
Toyota consultants that the US-Auto new engine program was able to identify the
necessary elements for visual management, and implement them in the final assembly
line.
Traditionally, US-Auto has left the design of the final assembly line as the very last part
of the plant that is designed. Historically, much more time and effort was spent on
designing the machining lines. As a result, the supplier of the final assembly line
typically received the contract for the line very late in the plant design process, and was
left very little time to design the line. Because the design of the final assembly was not
known when plant construction began, generous allowances for the final assembly line
and the material handling around the line were designed into the plant.
As a result, the final assembly lines within traditional US-Auto plants have excess space
around them in which inventory accumulates, and have large machines that block visual
management. By dedicating resources early to the design of the final assembly line, the
US-Auto new engine program was able to design the plant so that the distance between
the machining lines and the final assembly line was minimized, and the adequate
amount of space was allowed for the final assembly line. The early planning also
allowed US-Auto time to learn and implement many of the principles of the Toyota
Production System into the final assembly line.
4.2.1.6.1 Final Assembly Line Andon Board
Like the machining line andon system, the final assembly andon board is the primary
source of the status for the final assembly line, see Figure 15 - Assembly Line Andon
Board.
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Figure 15 - Assembly Line Andon Board
The primary difference between the machining and assembly andons is the operators'
activities. Unlike the machining lines, in the assembly line the operator remains at one
station to perform their job. It is the team leader who refers the most to the andon board
for guidance on what to do next.
On the assembly line most of the andon lights are turned on by the operators. If an
operator is falling behind or has a problem with a part or tool, they will pull the andon
cord for their station, lighting the yellow light that corresponds to their station. If the
problem is not resolved by the time the engine reaches the end of the station, the red
light for that station will go on, and the line will stop. When the line stops, the green
"Assembly" light at the top of the andon board also goes out.
Both the yellow and red lights are signals to the team leader that a team member needs
help. The team leader should continuously check the andon board to see the status of
the line, and which operators need help. See Appendix #4 for a detailed description of
the final assembly andon board operation.
4.3 Component Review
The final assembly line will be installing many components onto the engine. The final
assembly team wanted to be assured that these components being designed, that the
product engineers were aware of potential assembly concerns with their components. In
addition, the assembly team knew that the US-Auto new engine program has the goal of
building the lowest overall cost engine business. In order to accomplish this, the plant
must have high up-time, low scrap rate, and low operating costs. Component parts can
contribute to these metrics by being designed to be robust and have easy, error-proof
installation.
As Ulrich, et al state, "Manufacturing cost is a key determinant of the economic success
of a product. Economically successful design is ... about ensuring high product quality
while minimizing manufacturing costs. DFM [Design for Manufacturing] is one
methodology for achieving this goal; effective DFM practice leads to low manufacturing
costs without sacrificing product quality. " 22
The application of DFM to an assembly is DFA Design for assembly. A popular method
for doing DFA has been developed by Geoffery Boothrody and Peter Dewhurst.23 Their
DFA method involves using tables to evaluate the estimated assembly times of each
component, based on the shape of the component and the operations necessary to
assemble it.
The new engine program investigated using the Boothroyd Dewhurst method. The
program estimated that it would take two weeks of fully dedicated engineering time.
Engineering management felt that this time commitment was too great, considering the
work load the engineers were under.
As a result, the program decided to pursue an abbreviated DFA method, that had some
very good results. For guidance, the team consulted an internal DFA expert who has
taught DFA at the university level. He suggested the process the team followed.
The first step was to identify the DFA opportunities on the new engine. This
identification was done by a team composed of component engineers, assembly
advanced manufacturing engineers, and retired engine experts.
The team began by reviewing each station of the final engine assembly line, describing
the operations that occurred in that station, and ranking the DFA concern for that station.
About 15%-20% of the components had a high DFA concern after the initial evaluation.
Some of the concerns were due to the potential for the operators to install the parts
incorrectly, other components were difficult to install because of access problems, and
still other components were likely to be damaged in the installation process.
Each of the high items were then reviewed, and consolidated. The result of this process
was a list of 24 components or systems that had a high DFA risk. A high DFA risk was
defined as a component that deemed most likely to be a source of problems when the
engine is in production.
Assignments were given to the engineers of these components to look into the concerns
on their components, and write a one page summary of the current status and their
future plans.
The team then held review meetings in which each of the 24 concerns was discussed for
15 to 30 minutes. In them the component engineers were able to present their concerns
with their components, why they had concerns, and what they were doing to address
them.
In many cases the review meetings consisted of extensive information sharing and
brainstorming. After the initial DFA activity, the number of high concern DFA items was
reduced from 24 to 3. The reduction came because the design engineers redesigned
the parts. In some cases, unique features were added to the parts to assure that they
could not be installed incorrectly, in other cases, the product engineers worked with the
manufacturing engineers to improve the installation processes for specific components.
The team has aggressive plans to improve the final three items over the next few
months.
Another significant concern that was address was the oil filter adapter. This adapter is
used extensively in testing the engines during the assembly process. The new engine is
designed to be installed in two different vehicles. Because of the differences in the
engine compartments, the product engineers had designed two different adapters.
Switching between these two designs would have caused the testing machines to be
very complex, and would have added cycle time to calibrate the test stands after each
change over. The result of the DFA activity was to redesign and commonize the oil filter
adapter.
Although the DFA process used by the new engine team was not as detailed as the
Boothroyd Dewhurst approach, it was effective. Most of the significant assembly related
concerns with the engine were addressed. As a result, the engine will be easier to
assemble and test. This will reduce assembly time and complexity, leading to a better,
lower cost engine.
The new engine program made significant gains in design for assembly. Historically,
US-Auto has done a quick DFA review at the very end of the engine design process. At
this design stage it is very difficult and costly to include all but the most essential design
revisions. The new engine program did a DFA review much earlier in the design
process, thus it was much easier for the design engineers to incorporate design changes
that would make the engine easier to assemble. Improving the ease of assembly is
essential to implementing the principles of the Toyota Production System. The system
functions on standardized process that are continuously improved. If there are
significant problems with installing component parts, it will be difficult to standardize work
in each assembly station.
4.3 Conclusions from Final Assembly Line
Incorporating the principles of lean manufacturing into the final assembly line required a
great deal of learning, and many design iterations. The final assembly simultaneous
engineering team began designing the line by benchmarking other engine plants and
finding the best practices around the world. In addition, the team met with consultants
who had expertise in the Toyota Production System, to gain a greater understanding of
the details of implementing the elements of the Toyota Production System.
The team found that the most critical elements of the final assembly line were the flow of
the line, the material handling concept, and the visual management of the line. Initially
the differences in the options for the flow of the line (i.e. synchronous and asynchronous
flow) were not very strong. The team had to spend a lot of time with the Toyota experts
to learn the advantages of the synchronous line, and its fundamental role in the design
of entire line.
The US-Auto new engine program chose a material handling concept for the final
assembly line that is different from the one used in the Toyota Production system. After
careful analysis, the team felt that their line side market and parts pallet combination
would be more effective at handling the variety of combinations of components the new
engine has. Once the plant is operational, US-Auto will have to evaluate this new
concept in comparison to the material handling methods on a Toyota final assembly line
and determine which method is better.
Another critical element of the final assembly line for implementing lean manufacturing is
visual management. The team designed the line so that it would be managed by a
central andon board. All equipment on the line is designed so that it is low enough to be
seen over. These designs required the final assembly team to work closely with the
assembly line manufacturer to confirm that the supplier knew how to build a lean line.
Additionally, the team realized that the engine must be designed to make assembly as
easy and error proof as possible. This was accomplished using a design for assembly
process. Reviewing the engine for design for assembly resulted in identifying many
components that needed redesign to make them easier to assemble.
Traditionally, US-Auto has had two manufacturing engineers to design an engine final
assembly line. Additionally, these engineers began their design work after the other
lines in the plant had been designed. The US-Auto new engine program hired more
manufacturing engineers than other traditional US-Auto programs have, at a much early
point. Thus, the new engine program had both the resources and the time to implement
the principles of the Toyota Production System in the engine final assembly line.
5 Team Culture
5.1 Cultural Implications of TPS
As has been discussed above, the Toyota Production System is much different from the
production system that exists in all of US-Auto's plants. In fact, only an extremely small
percentage of US-Auto's staff is knowledge in the Toyota Production System. Thus, the
vast majority of US-Auto is operating under the more traditional mass production system.
Although the Toyota Production System is most visible in the factory, it impacts all parts
of the company, including sales, marketing, finance, procurement, customer support,
research & development, etc. As US-Auto changes to a lean production system, it will
require changing many parts of the company.
Such a wide reaching change is very difficult to accomplish, and is commonly met with
resistance. US-Auto personnel are beginning to realize what a wide spread change the
lean production system will cause. In fact, when the author presented many of the
thesis findings to a team of senior manufacturing engineers, much of the conversation
was about how different a method this is of operating, and that it is a change for both the
line workers and the supervisors and managers in the plant.
5.2 Feedback From Production Employees
Many automobile manufactures in the US have pursued implementing lean
manufacturing in their plants. This implementation has produced strong reactions from
both the production employees and the unions that represent them. The reader who is
contemplating making lean manufacturing improvements should be well aware of
potential employee concerns before proceeding. This section will discuss the concerns
that have been expressed about implementing lean manufacturing.
The book Choosinq Sides: Unions and the Team Concept24," by Parker and Slaughter,
is a book written for unionists documenting union concerns with lean manufacturing
implementation. Parker and Slaughter refer to implementation of teams and lean
manufacturing as "management-by-stress" or MBS.
'We prefer the term management-by-stress because....it describes how the system
actually works. Management-by-stress uses stress of all kinds - physical, social and
psychological - to regulate and boost production. It combines a systematic speedup,
'just-in-time' parts deliver, and strict control over how jobs are to be done, to create a
production system which has no leeway for errors -and very little breathing room.24"
Choosing Sides also discusses kaizen, or continuous improvement, as a source of
stress on employees. The production system is set up so that problems are surfaced,
and even stop the line if it is required. Thus, problems are extremely noticeable.
Production employees are expected to take the initial actions to solve the problems, and
then seek the help of their team leader if it is required. The authors also point out that
the visual management system makes it difficult to hide a problem, allowing everyone to
see who is responsible, resulting in pressure put on "...those who fail to respond to the
demands of the system2 4."
The concerns that Parker and Slaughter express can result from a poor implementation
of the Toyota Production System. If employees have their jobs very narrowly defined,
are given inadequate training, and expected to have high output, stress can easily occur.
In order to alleviate some of the concerns mentioned above, Jan Klein recommends
giving teams more autonomy 25. She recommends allowing the teams on each of the
lines the freedom to determine the sequence that each task is performed. Moving work
between jobs should also be decided on by the team, and all team members impacted
should agree to any changes. The stress of a job can also be reduced by allowing team
members to rotate between jobs25. Finally, jobs can be more humanized by assuring
that there is sufficient person to person interaction on the lines.
The new engine program has included many of these stress reducers in the plant
design. Teams will be assigned to each machining line, and within the teams, the
operators will have the responsibility of improving the operations. This includes allowing
the operators to reconfigure stations or move work between jobs. In addition, cross-
training within each of the teams will be highly encouraged. Person to person contact
will occur regularly on the line, very little of the material handling, or tool replenishment is
automated. Plant wide personnel will frequently stop by each department.
5.3 Feedback From Professionals and Managers
The resistance to the implementation of lean manufacturing occurs amongst
professionals and managers too. The US-Auto new engine program professional and
managerial groups are an interesting demographic mix. It is particularly interesting to
note how background relates to how lean manufacturing is adopted within the
manufacturing engineering organization.
For many of the manufacturing engineers, this is their first job within the automotive
industry, and for several it is their first job out of college. These engineers embraced
UPS/TPS. They had learned its merits in school, and had not ownership in the
traditional US-Auto engine plant designs.
The remainder of the manufacturing engineering organization had previous automotive
experience, both with US-Auto and other automobile manufactures. About two-thirds of
those with automotive experience were supportive of the implementation of lean
manufacturing. The rest were skeptics.
Unfortunately all of the lean manufacturing skeptics were in leadership roles in
manufacturing engineering. This created tension between the employees and the
management, which became extreme in a few cases. This tension became evident in
project wide culture surveys. In response to one survey, 10% of the organization felt
that an environment existed on the project that made it unsafe to raise issues.
Comments included "who are the decision makers, overbearing personalities exist."
The reader may wonder why someone in a leadership position would be skeptical of
lean manufacturing. The researcher believes that the skepticism is due to a perceived
loss of control. In order to achieve a leadership position within in the hierarchical US-
Auto culture, one has to achieve certain skills. Within manufacturing engineers, these
skills obviously tend to be knowledge of production systems. The new engine program
has chosen to implement a production system that is different from the production
system that many of the manufacturing engineering leaders are familiar with. They,
along with their employees, are having to learn and implement a new production system.
As the program evolved, consultants were used to teach the new production system.
Suddenly, the experts in the production system were not those that had extensive
experience within US-Auto engine plants, but relatively young consultants who were new
to US-Auto. This required that employees be continuous learners. It did not take too
long to notice that some employees were not making an effort to understand the new
production system, and were intending to implement as many elements of the traditional
manufacturing systems as possible.
The author believes that these leaders are much more comfortable implementing the
systems that got them promoted, rather then learning a new production system. These
leaders were suffering from a perceived loss of control. Unfortunately, they failed to
realize that they also possessed general management strengths which could be used to
effectively implement a lean production system. In order to help recognize and dispel
these tensions, the new engine program intends to work with an organizational
development consultant.
5.4 Conclusions
The above sections are meant to serve as a caution to the person that believes
implementing lean manufacturing is a painless task. It is common for employees to
undergo tension when they are asked to adopt the Toyota Production System. Proper
management awareness of the tension, and prompt response can help the organization
be successful. The US-Auto new engine program used external organizational
development consultants to help relieve the tensions and promote effective team work.
Parker and Slaughter also offer suggestions on how to make lean manufacturing more
acceptable to a labor force that is accustomed to a mass production system. Appendix
7.6 Appendix 6: Key Elements of a Humanized Workplace summarizes their
recommendations.
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6 Conclusion and Recommendations
6.1 Lean Manufacturing Differs From Mass Production
The majority of this thesis has been dedicated to documenting the lessons learned from
implementing lean manufacturing. There are significant differences in designing an plant
to operate like a Toyota plant compared to a traditional US-Auto plant. To make sure
that the Toyota Production System was properly understood and implemented, US-Auto
did two very strategic things.
First, the engine program invested heavily in manufacturing engineers early in the
project. Second, the program sought experts to teach them what they did not know.
Both strategies are discussed in the sections below.
6.2 Invest Early
John Preston, of the MIT Entrepreneurship Center, describes two different common
investment strategies28. Strategy A is to invest conservatively, in small amounts over a
longer period of time. Strategy B is to do the majority of the investment heavily very early
in the project. These two strategies are illustrated in Figure 16 - Financing Capital
Equipment and New Technology, below.
Net
A is the Minimalist Curve
B is the Optimal Curve
Figure 16 - Financing Capital Equipment and New Technology
As the figure shows, investing early can result in a large payoff early in the project. US-
Auto experienced the B curve on the new engine program. By staffing manufacturing
engineering at 55 people, rather than the traditional 15 US-Auto was able to implement
the prinicples of the Toyota Production System into both the design of the plant and the
design of the engine. (Appendix 5 contains further discussion of these investment
strategies.)
The additional manufacturing engineers had the time to benchmark many other engine
plants for best practices, and then develop their line designs based on this information.
The teams then spent a great deal of time reviewing these designs with the Toyota
experts, which resulted in numerous revisions.
The payoff of this heavy early investment has been seen in the design process through
the $80M savings in the plant budget, however the true payoff will be seen when the
plant is in production. Based on the well thoughout, detailed design, US-Auto senior
management is predicting the new engine plant will be the company's most efficient and
lowest cost engine plant.
6.3 Seek Expertise
The second strategy that the new engine program pursued was to seek expertise. The
program management quickly realized that the very few of the employees on the
program were familiar with the principles of the Toyota Production System. Part of this
knowledge gap was rectified through training in UPS, yet that training still only provided
fundamental knowledge of the principles. To properly implement this new production
system, the employees needed advisors for guidance.
To ensure that the teams were properly implementing the new production system, US-
Auto hired several consultants who had worked in Toyota's engine plants. These
consultants explained both the how, how Toyota specific aspects of the system, as well
as the why, why was that element necessary to make the system function. Without the
guidance of these consultants, the US-Auto new engine program would have had a very
hard time implementing the new production system.
US-Auto needs to find ways of sharing the knowledge gained on the new engine
program with the rest of the corporation. Since the plant will be built in an emerging
market country, it will be difficult for many other US-Auto employees to learn from visiting
the plant. The majority of the knowledge transfer will have to be through those who
implemented the new production system. The goal of this thesis is to document some of
the knowledge gained by working with these Toyota consultants. It should supply an
overview of some of the lessons learned on the new engine program, and should help
future programs get a faster start on implementing the US-Auto Production system.
6.4 Culture Shock
A final caution in implementing lean manufacturing is to be very aware of the potential
culture shock that can result. The Toyota Production System is very different from
traditional productions systems that have been implemented in the last 50 years within
the US. Implementing the new production system is cultural change that should not be
underestimated.
Employees throughout US-Auto have built their careers on the traditional production
system. Adopting a new production system could be seen as a threat to these careers.
To overcome the concerns of the new production system, managers must be aware of
their employees concerns and work to alleviate them.
The US-Auto new engine program provided resources to help the team members build
an expertise in lean manufacturing that would help them further their careers. The
program also made extensive use of organizational development resources to make
sure that both spoken and unspoken concerns regarding this new system were
addressed.
Additionally, poor implementation of lean manufacturing can result in increased stress
amongst production personnel. In order to allieviate this stress, employees must be
involved in helping design their jobs, and must be allowed to particpate in decisions to
make changes to their jobs.
Implementing a Toyota type production system is becoming a necessity for a company
to be competitive in the next century. As the US-Auto new engine program has shown,
with the proper resources and commitment, it is possible to properly implement a lean
production system.
Appendix 1: Assembly Team's Process Rules
Process Rule Benchmark
1) Continuously moving synchronous zones Toyota, GM-Opel
2) The line is decoupled in auto stations Toyota, GM-Opel
3) Pulls system (no work ahead of zone) Toyota, GM-Opel
4) Andon pull cord system Toyota, GM-Opel
5) One loop Various, COS concepts
6) All operators on the same side of the line Various, COS concepts
(outside the loop)
1) No material or traffic on the inside of the loop Various, COS concepts
2) No sub-assembly of parts Toyota, GM-Opel
3) One pallet Various, COS concepts
4) Manual engine rotation built into the pallet Toyota, Ford, Jaguar
5) Pallet will include trays or parts Toyota, COS concepts
6) Error-proofing of complexity performed in line- Toyota, Ford, GM, EC-
side market areas AUTO, etc,
7) One piece repair spur at auto stations EC-AUTO, Audi, COS
concepts
8) Three piece repair spurs at Cold Test and Air Various, COS concepts
Test
9) No manual repair of an automatic or semi- Ford, COS concepts
automatic fastener run-down
10) Rejected engines will be returned to the Ford, COS concepts
appropriate zone
11) Minimized/controlled buffers Toyota, COS concepts
12) Visual management standards COS concepts
13) 3 meters per work zone Toyota, GM-Opel
14) Ergonomic specifications Toyota, GM-Opel, Audi,
EC-AUTO, etc.
15) SOP's (Standard Operating Procedures) for Toyota, Bosch, MWM, etc.
operators will include visual parts inspection.
16) SOP's for line-side markets Toyota, Honda, GM-Opel
17) SOP's for part positions on pallet trays Toyota, Honda, COS
concepts
18) Entire auto zone cycle time = manual cycle COS concepts
time
19) All automatic and test stations are flow through COS concepts
type
20) No washers on the assembly line Toyota, COS concepts
Appendix 2: Program Timeline During Thesis Research
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Bring in Org. Development Consultants _ _
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Appendix 3: Tool Change Procedure
In the Toyota Production System, tool changes are done by the operators, during the
production shift. The tool change procedure is detailed below.
Tool Change Procedure
1) Operator goes to machine that needs tool change
2) Puts machine in standby mode, removes worn tools, and places them on the red side of the
tool holding box. New tools are taken from the blue side of the box and installed on machine.
Operator puts machine back into automatic mode, allows one part to run, stops the machine,
and performs a quality check on the first part run after the tool change. Machine is put back
into automatic mode.
3) Tool holding box with wom tools is taken to the tool set-up area in the machining department.
4) Operator goes to tool storage rack to retrieve another blue/red box with new tools in it. These
are drills, reamers, or taps only, no fixtures.
5) Operator removes worn drills from fixtures, places them on the red side of the tool holder box,
and removes the sharp tools from the box, and installed the fixtures on them.
6) Box with worn bits is placed on top of the tool storage cabinet on the aisle, for pick-up by tool
regrind personnel.
7) Operator gets set-up tools
8) And delivers them to the side of the machine for the next tool change.
234
2 3 1 4 QC 1I2I13 L1W2hL
Machining Line
Regrind Tool
Store
Figure 17- Tool Change Procedure
Appendix 4: Detailed Description of Andon Boards
This appendix is a detailed description of andon board in both machining and assembly
lines. It has been written so that it can be used as a stand alone document.
A4. 1 Introduction
A fundamental principle of the Toyota Production System is visual control. Visual control
is the concept that the status of an item or process can be determined by looking at a
easy to understand display, rather than having to investigate to determine the status. In
production lines, Toyota uses an andon board for visual control. This paper will describe
the andon boards that are used in a Toyota engine plant.
This paper will describe the purpose of the andon board, then give a detailed description
of the andon boards in both machining and assembly lines, and finally give several
examples of how the andon board operates in use.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a very detailed description of how an andon
board is designed and used. The examples are from an engine plant machining line and
engine assembly lines, but the descriptions should be sufficient for the reader to
understand how an andon can be applied to any machining or assembly line.
The research for this paper was conducted on a Leaders for Manufacturing internship at
one of the Big-Three US automobile firms, which will be referred to as US-Auto. This
auto company is in the process of designing a new engine and a new engine plant. The
plant is striving to implement a lean production system, and the Toyota Production
System is the benchmark. To learn about Toyota, the new engine program hired several
consultants, many of whom had extensive experience working for Toyota. The author
worked closely with these Toyota experts to learn about the andon system.
A4.2 Purpose of an Andon Board
One of the most significant differences between a machining line in a Toyota plant and
one in a typical US-Auto plant is how the operators know what to do throughout their
workday. In current US-Auto engine plants, the operators are assigned to a station by
their supervisor. They commonly work at the same station all day. If another part of the
line has a problem during the day and needs additional help, the supervisor will reassign
operators to that area.
In a Toyota engine plant machining line, operators work in all parts of the machining line.
The operators refer to the andon board throughout the day to know what to work on
next. Team leaders do not assign the operator to areas, or tell them what to do during
the day. The andon board sets the workers' priorities and the entire machining line is
managed by it. Andons are a "...technique of providing information and instruction about
the elements of a job in a clearly visible manner so that the worker can maximize his
productivity10."
Thus, the location of the andon board on the line is critical - operators must be able to
see it from all parts of the department. If it is not visible, alternative methods must be
found for helping the operators see the board. On some Toyota lines, monitors
connected to cameras pointed at the andon board are used to project the andon board
into areas where the board itself is not visible.
An engine plant primarily consists of two types of departments: machining and
assembly. In general, the machining departments machine the primary metal
components of the engine, such as the cylinder head, cylinder block, crankshaft,
camshafts, and connecting rods.
The machining line of an engine plant starts with castings or forgings, and machines
them into a net shape. This is done by using large machine tools that perform
operations such as milling, drilling, reaming, tapping, honing, broaching, grinding, and
polishing. The machine tools are roughly 6'x6'x6'. A line that machines one component
for an engine may have 20 of these machine tools. Parts a usually transferred between
the machines by an automation system. In a Toyota plant, a machining line is run by four
team members, and one team leader.
Engine plants also have a final engine assembly department. This department
assembles both the machined components from the machining departments in the plant,
as well as components purchased from external suppliers. The assembly department is
much more labor intensive. Most parts are manually located, and then automation is
used to tighten fasteners. In a Toyota plant, an assembly line is run by 40 team
members and four team leaders.
This paper will describe the andon boards for both machining and assembly lines.
A4.3 Overview of a Machining Line Andon Board
This section will give an overview of an andon board, and then describe each portion of
the andon board in detail. Each of the machining lines in an engine plant has one andon
board. Andon means lantern in Japanese26 . The board is of relatively simple
construction - it consists of light bulbs behind colored Plexiglas. SeeFigure 18 -
Machining Line Andon Board, below.
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Figure 18 - Machining Line Andon Board
A4.3.1 The Numbers
The numbers on the andon board refer to the operation number on the line. In a large
machining department, each operation usually consists of several individual machines
that are connected via an automatic handling system. These machines are usually
grouped together into an operation because they are processing the same area of the
part, or using similar processes.
Figure 19 depicts a crankshaft machining line andon board. In the US-Auto new plant
design, Crankshaft Operation #1 will prepare the ends of the crankshaft. It will consist of
machines that mill both ends of the crankshaft casting to length, hollow mill one end, drill
both ends, and mill a manufacturing pad on a counterweight. Figure 19 - US-Auto
Crankshaft, below, depicts the crankshaft after all machining operations have been
done.
Figure 19 - US-Auto Crankshaft
When one of the numbers on the andon board is lit, it indicates that an operator needs to
work on one of the machines in the operation. Since there are several machines within
one operation, the operator needs a method of knowing which machine to go to. Each
machine in a Toyota machining line has a light on it. When the machine needs an
operator to attend to it, the light on the machine turns on, an the andon light that
corresponds to the operation is lit. Thus, when the operator goes to the station, he/she
knows to work on the machine with the lit light.
A4.3.2 The Letters
The letters depicted on the andon board in Figure 1 serve various purposes. 4A, 7A,
and 14A are all accumulators. An accumulator is a buffer of parts between a series of
operations. The buffer is both to allow time to do a quality check, as well as to allow
production continue if some operations require a long tool change over.
The QC beneath 4A and 7A are to signal the need for a quality check. A quality check
will usually consist of check the features that were machined in the preceding
operations.
The VCK beneath 14A signals the need for a visual check. This visual check occurs at
the end of the machining line. In performing the visual check, the operator quickly looks
at each part in the accumulator, and then releases all of the good parts to the assembly
line.
The Mat light signals that the line needs more raw materials. In the case of the
crankshaft line, the operator will have to fill up the initial buffer with more crankshaft
castings.
TL1, TL2, and TL3 signal the need for a team leader in an area. In a typical Toyota
crankshaft line there are four team members and one team leader. If a team member
needs assistance, they will press a button to call the team leader. There are three of
these call buttons located throughout the crankshaft machining line. In responding to the
call, the team leader will go to the call button area, and should easily be able to find the
team member that needs assistance.
Assy signals that the assembly line that the completed parts are being supplied to has
stopped. The crankshaft line does not stop when the assembly line does, it continues to
work until all of its buffers are full, and then stops. The assy light is a warning to the
crankshaft line that the line may stop soon.
Full is a signal that the buffer between the crankshaft line and the assembly line is full.
When this buffer is full, the end of the crankshaft line will stop. If the other accumulators
on the line are not full, the portions of the line that feed the accumulators will continue to
run until they are full.
A4.3.3 Overall Status
The crankshaft andon board contains three indicators of the overall status of the
machining line. The first indicator is the Crankshaft signal at the top of the board. If the
crankshaft line is running, this light is on. If the line is stopped, either because of an
internal problem, or a problem with raw material, or the assembly line, the crankshaft
light turns off.
The second indicator of overall status is the Avail display. This display tracks what
percent of the workday the line was available for production.
The final indicator of overall status is the Prod display. This counter tracks how many
crankshafts the line has produced during a shift.
A4.4 The Machining Line Andon Board in Operation
The key to the andon board is its role in the production system. In a machining line,
each station is connected to the andon board. The machines have been designed with
autonomation, which is the ability for the machine to stop automatically when it detects a
failure. Thus, when a machine needs an operator's attention, an andon light is lit, and
an operator responds.
The lights on the andon board have different colors and correspondingly different
meanings. See Figure 9 - Andon Light Meanings, below.
I Machine Fault
Solid Red
I Tool Change/Part Feed
SolidYellow
* Quality Check Forecasted
Flashing Yellow
[]0 Manual mode - Operator at Machine
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L Special Instructions
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Figure 20 - Andon Light Meanings
As can be expected, there are different reasons that the andon lights are lit. Both the
solid yellow and flashing yellow lights are warnings. They notify the team members
that the machine needs to be attended to soon. The yellow lights are usually lit by a
counter on the machine that tracks how many parts have gone through.
For example, the machines have been programmed to count how many parts are
machined using a single drill, and how often the drill needs to be changed because it is
dull. When the machine has 50 more parts to machine before the drill needs to be
changed, the yellow andon light for that operation is lit, and a light on the specific
machine also turns on.
The solid red light turns on when the machine stops. The machine may have stopped
because of an unexpected failure, such as a broken tool, jammed part, or machine
malfunction. Alternatively, the machine may have stopped because a routine tool
change, maintenance, or quality check was not performed. If tools are not changed on
time, the machine is programmed to stop.
The solid white light signals that team member is at the station. When a team member
responds to an andon light, he/she first turns on a light over the machine to provide more
light to see by while working on the machine. This same light is connected to the andon
board, and turns on the white light that corresponds to the station the team member is
at. The white light signals to everyone that someone is responding to the andon. It also
serves to notify everyone where the team members are in the machining line.
The reasons that the remaining lights are lit have been described above, in chapter 2.
A4.4.1 Andon Light Example: Tool Change
Routinely a machine tool will require the change of some perishable tooling, such as a
drill bit. The causes of tool wear are beyond the scope of this paper the interested
reader may refer to Modern Metal Cutting from the tool supplier Sandvik27 for a very
thorough discussion of tool wear. Toyota carefully studies the wear of each tool, and
knows how many parts can be machined before a tool change is necessary. A counter
on the machine tracks how many parts have been machined by a tool.
a) Yellow Light
The machine is programmed so that it lights an andon light turns on 50 units before a
tool change is required. This gives the operator time to get to the machine and perform
the tool change before the tool is completely worn and the line shuts down. The andon
signal for a forecasted tool change is a solid yellow light for the operation that needs the
change.
b) White Light + Yellow Light
When the operator goes to the machine to perform the tool change, the first thing he/she
does is turn the machine to manual mode and turn on a light over the station. This lights
a white light on the andon board. This signals to the other operators on the line that the
someone is taking care of the tool change. The operator then changes the tool, and
resets the machine. The machine runs one part and stops. The operator then performs
a quality check on the first part.
c) No Lights
If the part is good he/she resets the machine (which turns off all andon lights for
that station) and leaves the station.
A4.4.2 Andon Light Example: Machine Failure
Another scenario of when an andon light is lit is when a machine failure occurs.
a) Red Light
When the machine senses a failure, it immediately shuts down and sends a signal to
light the red andon light that corresponds to the station. This failure may be due to a
broken drill bit, jammed part, machine failure, or a missed quality check.
b) Red Light + White Light
The operator responds to the station, and turns on the light over the station, which lights
the white andon light. The operator then proceeds to fix the problem.
c) Red Light + White Light + Orange Light
If the operator needs assistance, he/she will go to the team leader call button in the work
area and press it. This will light the orange TL light on the andon board, signaling that
team leader assistance is required in the area.
No Lights
When the machine is repaired, the operator resets the machine, checks the first part,
and resets the machine if the part is passes inspection.
A4.5 Overview of an Assembly Line Andon Board
Like the machining line andon system, the final assembly andon board is the primary
source of the status for the final assembly line, see Figure 21 - Assembly Line Andon
Board.
Red Yellow White Orange Green
Figure 21 - Assembly Line Andon Board
The primary difference between the machining and assembly andons is the operators'
activities. Unlike the machining lines, in the assembly line the operator remains at one
station to perform their job. The team leader refers the most to the andon board for
guidance on what to do next.
On the assembly line, the operators turn on most of the andon lights. Both the yellow
and red lights are signals to the team leader that a team member needs help. The team
leader is continuously checking the andon board to see the status of the line, and which
operators need help.
A4.5.1 The Letters
The construction of an assembly line andon board is very similar to the machining line
andon board. The most significant difference is that an assembly line andon board has
no white lights for each of the station numbers. In a machining line, the white lights on
the andon board are lit to signal the location of a team member. On an assembly line,
there is no need to signal the location of a team member - each station has a team
member at it all of the time because the work is very labor intensive.
The other significant differences between the machining and assembly andon boards
are the special instruction lights. These lights are all orange, and are in the bottom row
of Figure 21 - Assembly Line Andon Board.
Sho signals that the final assembly line has a shortage of component parts from the
machining departments in the engine plant.
Kan signals the need for the team leaders to pick up the kanban cards on the line.
The other two orange lights in the bottom row signal the need to replenish specific items
that are stocked on the line. LG signals the need for more liquid gasket, BLT signals
the need for more bolts.
The green FULL light signals that the buffer of finished engines is full.
A.4.6 The Assembly Line Andon Board in Operation
A4.6.1 Andon Light Example: Problems with Components
a) Yellow Light
If team member has a problem with a part or tool, they will pull the andon cord for their
station, lighting the yellow light that corresponds to their station. The team leader will
respond to the light and help the team member fix the problem.
Red Light + Assembly Light Off
If the problem is not resolved by the time the engine reaches the end of the station, the
red light for that station will go on, and the line will stop. When the line stops, the green
"Assembly" light at the top of the andon board also goes out.
A4.6.2 Andon Light Example: Kanban Pick-up
Kan Light
The Kan light signals the need for the team leaders to pick up the kanban cards on the
line. As the team members assemble the engines, they are using component parts that
are typically stocked in bins at the side of the line. Each bin of parts contains a kanban
card that is used to signal the need for additional parts. Every time a team member
begins using parts out of a new container, they first remove the kanban card from the
container and put the card in a collection box on the parts rack. Several times during a
shift the kanban andon light signals the team leaders to walk around the line and collect
all of the kanban cards from the racks, and put them in a central pick-up box for the line.
Shortly thereafter, a plant wide material handling person will come by and pick up all of
the kanban cards for the line.
A4.7 Conclusions
This paper has described the components of both machining and assembly line andon
boards. Although the reader should be able to understand how to design an andon
system for similar lines, he/she should keep in mind that implementing an andon system
requires much more that only designing the andon board.
An effective andon system requires that everyone in the plant is trained in the andon
system, and uses it. The team leaders must allow the andon system to tell the team
members what to work on, rather than assigning them to an area. And team members
must correctly use the system, not circumvent the lights. It is only when everyone
understands and follows the lights that the system becomes trusted and effective.
Appendix 5: Investment Timing
This Appendix is an excerpt from the transcript of a presentation given by John Preston,
President and CEO of Quantum Energy 8.
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"...How investment is infused into a company. This graph shows you two different
scenarios for how to invest in a start-up company. I'm plotting new flow of money as a
function of time. When you're negative, you're investing money; when you're positive,
you're making a return on the investment. This first curve, this "A" curve, says. "Let's put
a small amount of money in this company over a long period of time, in the hope of
going positive." That curve actually has a number of problems associated with it. First,
the management spend too much time raising money instead of building the business,
and second, it creates a wide window of opportunity for a competitor to come in more
aggressively on the "B" curve and kill them. What really surprises me is that most large
US companies tend to behave on the "A" curve, rather than the "B" curve. Now why is
that? If you look at the time horizon of going cash flow positive - the "break-even point"
- if the time horizon is very short (less than two years) the company is more inclined to
invest on the "B" curve. The reason is that companies are being judged on a relatively
short term time horizon. If you ask who owns our large companies in the United States,
they are really owned by speculators in the stock market. They are owned by pension
funds, and other stock market gamblers. You ask, 'What's the time horizon of those
gamblers?" It's very short: only 6-18 months.
I believe it's different in Japan banks have a much larger role in ownership of the largest
Japanese companies. The banks have a little bit longer time horizon which enables the
management of the largest Japanese companies to behave a little bit better long term
than their counterparts in the United States. If you have management driven by short
term behavior, and you have a radical innovation that might take five years to hit the
payback, they will cut any investment from this optimum curve (the "B" curve) down to
the "A" curve. Management can become a hero by cutting back to the "A" curve
because al of this area will go to short term profits. All this area is long-term lost
opportunity, but because they're being judged in the short term, they'll make more
money in the short term from a lower level of company assets. "
Appendix 6: Key Elements of a Humanized Workplace
This appendix contains a list of key elements of a humanized workplace. These are
quoted or paraphrased from the book Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Concept24,
by Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter. The list is in alphabetical order.
Attendance:
Allows for outside demand by giving employees the right to flexible 'personal'
days.
Choice in Kind of Job:
It should be as easy as possible for workers to choose their jobs in order to
discover the one that is the 'best fit.'
Cleanliness of Plant:
Management-by-stress )MBS) plants are often clean and well organized.
Courtesy:
Management-by-stress plants are noted for maintaining the symbols of respect
and formal courtesy.
Environmental Control:
The work environment - heating, air conditioning, clean air, and noise control -
make a difference to people who are working hard, day in and day out.
Ergonomics:
Management-by-stress systems seem much stronger in this area than traditional
plants.
Facilities:
At MBS plants management and workers use the same cafeterias, parking lots,
and restrooms.
Learning New Skills:
Training under MBS is even more job-specific than in traditional plants (and,
consequently, less marketable)
Outside Contracting and Outsourcing:
These are job security and skill issues. Outside contracting severely restricts the
available job choices to workers within the company. It denies them the
opportunity to develop new skills, or to find a job that 'fits' better.
Pacing the Work:
Humanized work design would increase the possibilities for workers to pace their
own jobs.
Quality Work:
Being allowed to do quality work is part of having a good job. In MBS plants as
well as traditional plants, despite all the quality campaigns, few workers have any
control at all over their product.
Resolving Grievances:
A humanized approach to work would find ways to separate out problems and
deal with them in an appropriate amount of time at the appropriate level.
Response to Problems:
In humanized work environment, problems such as faulty batch of parts would be
expected, and extra resources - machines, inventory, and people - would be
kept in reserve to cushion the effect of the problem on the people involved.
Rights on the Job:
Though not a perfect system, seniority is the fairest way to counter arbitrary
management action. Job rights also cover the right to transfer jobs or shift at
certain intervals, the right to refuse an unsafe job, the right to call for a union
representative, and the right to get medical assistance immediately.
Task Size:
There is an increasing recognition that a larger job with more operations (in a
greater time period) is often more satisfying. MBS consciously attempts to break
production down to small tasks for each worker.
Technology:
Technology can be used to make jobs easier, safer, and more interesting.
Trust:
A humanized work environment is build on the trustworthiness of the
overwhelming majority rather than on the dishonesty of a few.
Voluntary Teamwork:
A humanized work design would encourage workers to help each other and
would reward collective efforts at least as much as individual ones. ... It would
also allow time and provide facilities for workers to meet, talk to each other, talk
to management, and solve problems.
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